Joel's slides included the following:
In the Beginning Was...
And then came their descendants:
- Classical definitionism: concepts are like entries in a dictionary.
- Classical imagism: concepts are like pictures in the mind.
- Prototype and exemplar theories (Rosch)
- Informational atomism (Fodor)
- Proxytypes theory (Prinz)
- Conceptual spaces theory (Gärdenfors)
A couple of speakers brought up the question of a 'space of spaces'. Centeredness also preoccupies us in health and education. We are desperate to pick up the patient and the student and put them at the center of things. I keep wondering (see link below) about the extent to which structure and a theory of cognition are interdependent in terms of the resulting conceptual spaces? Since the late 1980s Buzan's mind-mapping has struck me as not being 'grounded'. This may not be an issue in many applications, but for a generic conceptual framework some underlying structure (dimensions) seems essential.
- Attempt to describe how all of an individual conceptual agent’s conceptual spaces map or weave together into a single unified space, a “space of spaces” describable along certain common axes.
- By extension, how all of the individual conceptual agents’ unified spaces map together, in linguistic human society, into a single, common unified space.
- Unlike CST, UCST is explicitly enactive: concepts are located not in the agent nor in the environment but in the interaction of agent and environment.
Joel also considered this:
I hope I can make contact with Joel and return to this. He indicated papers and further projects with colleagues and a piece of software.
- One major shortcoming of currently available mind-mapping software is the lack of any well-defined theory of cognition (let alone theory of concepts) underlying the application.
Additional link (Hodges' model - nexus, structure):