I've described h2cm as a foundation, a substrate for the health and social care assessments that follow. And that's the question: what is there before the conceptual framework is populated? As a foundation the model is initially empty, void, null. In terms of theory, practice, values and judgements there are none. The piece of paper is blank. So is the screen. Once (quickly) learned, the professionals have the conceptual framework in mind (ready to call upon), but it is not exercised. Until they encounter a patient, client, carer amid a situation, the conceptual space is empty.
|Lund, Hobykrok B&B in the distance - the farm track|
In a way I don't want to venture into this space. There are monsters there. I know the above is far removed from nursing. Where is compassion, dignity, respect, plans and empathy in all this? ... Once the care concepts are realised then: yes - do lead the way. But before the light is turned on: no.
No: but there is no choice. The question needs to be asked and settled.
Liane Gabora gave a talk at Conceptual Spaces At Work. Checking back on her previous work I found this (SCOP: State COntext Property theory of concepts):
An important notion in SCOP is the ground state of a concept, denoted p. This is the ‘raw’ or ‘undisturbed’ state of a concept; the state it is in when it is not being evoked or thought about, not participating in the structuring of a conscious experience (such as, most likely, the concept ZEBRA when you began reading this paper). The ground state is the state of being not disturbed at all by the context. One never experiences a concept in its ground state; it is always evoked in some context. The notion of ground state is somewhat similar to the notion of prototype. The ground state is a theoretical construct; it cannot be observed directly but only indirectly through how the concept interacts with various contexts (which may include other concepts). p. 436.
Gabora, L., Aerts, D. (2009) A model of the emergence and evolution of integrated worldviews, Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 53, 434–451.