Book review iii: 'Categories we live by'
In thinking about (with?) Hodges' model, I often feel there is a flip-flop nature to where exactly concepts sit; or more accurately the perspective (care/knowledge domain) from which they are viewed.
Murphy introduces dual-character concepts, 'which are things that have both a prototype (or rule) and an ideal.' p.30. and quotes from:
Knobe J, Prasada S, Newman GE. Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition. 2013 May;127(2):242-57. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005. Epub 2013 Mar 1. PMID: 23454798.
- person :: service-centredness
- parity of esteem (mental - physical)
- confusion - dementia :: delirium (infection, dehydration)
- mental capacity :: best interests
- community care :: 'in care'
- clinical risk - positive risk taking
- healthcare :: social care
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179–195). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529863.009
'Psychological essentialism should not be equated with the classical view that concepts are representations of classes of objects that have singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership. ... More generally, we propose that the knowledge representations people have for concepts may contain what might be called an essence placeholder. There are several possibilities for what is in such placeholder. In some cases, but by no means in all, it might be filled with beliefs about what properties are necessary and sufficient for the thing to be what it is. In other cases it might be filled with a more complex, and possibly more inchoate, "theory" of what makes the thing the thing that it is (see Murphy & Medin,1985). It might, additionally, contain the belief (or a representation of the belief) that there are people, experts, who really know what makes the thing the thing that it is, or scholars who are trying to figure out exactly what it is. Just as with theories, what the placeholder contains may change, but the placeholder remains.' pp.184-185.
Many thanks to MIT Press for the review copy.

orcid.org/0000-0002-0192-8965
