Book review iii: 'Categories we live by'

In thinking about (with?) Hodges' model, I often feel there is a flip-flop nature to where exactly concepts sit; or more accurately the perspective (care/knowledge domain) from which they are viewed.

Murphy introduces dual-character concepts, 'which are things that have both a prototype (or rule) and an ideal.' p.30. and quotes from:

Knobe J, Prasada S, Newman GE. Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition. 2013 May;127(2):242-57. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005. Epub 2013 Mar 1. PMID: 23454798.

Do dual character concepts operate at varied levels, and in their association (semantic) proximity - relationship to other concepts? All this changing according to context.

Murphy explores the dual category nature of people who claim to be scientists, but are really following a hobbyhorse. That is not lost on me. Others, a baker is following scientific principles while not technically being a scientist p.31. The discussion on art - artists is also informative; turn the page, and that on RINOs - Republican In Name Only - is very timely! There are the problems that science itself can contribute. If you don't know your oxeye daisy from osedaxes you can find out here: fascinating. 

'Health' is dual category in a great many respects (and with a chapter to follow). Many have been and will continue to be discussed here:

• person :: service-centredness
• parity of esteem (mental - physical)
• confusion - dementia :: delirium (infection, dehydration)
• mental capacity :: best interests
• community care :: 'in care'
• clinical risk - positive risk taking
• healthcare :: social care

There's a need for careful deliberation too as does this apply to any situation in which there is a smell of  dichotomy: good, or bad?

Chapter 3 'Categories in the World and in the Head' helps straight away - declaring a false dichotomy. For me, it's worth revisiting natural categories, natural kinds and essential categories and psychological essentialism. Get these right and surely that's a useful toolkit, or more accurately - first aid kit?

I'm grateful for the placeholder essence (p.46) from:

Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179–195). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529863.009

'Psychological essentialism should not be equated with the classical view that concepts are representations of classes of objects that have singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership. ... More generally, we propose that the knowledge representations people have for concepts may contain what might be called an essence placeholder. There are several possibilities for what is in such placeholder. In some cases, but by no means in all, it might be filled with beliefs about what properties are necessary and sufficient for the thing to be what it is. In other cases it might be filled with a more complex, and possibly more inchoate, "theory" of what makes the thing the thing that it is (see Murphy & Medin,1985). It might, additionally, contain the belief (or a representation of the belief) that there are people, experts, who really know what makes the thing the thing that it is, or scholars who are trying to figure out exactly what it is. Just as with theories, what the placeholder contains may change, but the placeholder remains.' pp.184-185.

Hodges' model provides four placeholders. In reading and watching videos on category theory, it appears there is a role for 'placeholders'. I realise the applications - contexts differ, but analogies are powerful too.

Regards, classification as an exercise in convenience, despite the emphasis upon evidence, how often even in clinical matters does it come down to convenience? More to follow on this.

I've never wanted Hodges' model to be a grab-bag for keywords, concepts - categories! So it helps ease that concern, in chapter 4 to see words and categories contrasted. I always wondered about the media's preoccupation with the Inuit and 'snow'. 'Salient' is here as expected in 'Language, Culture and Categories' and with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis p.53. And, of course, nursing and everything else relies on language p.57. Prof. Murphy's mention of children figuring out when it comes to language, and adults just how crazy it - the rules - can seem. While impossible, by definition, I had this thought of toddlers instigating a class action to get things put right. I like the way Murphy reaches across cultures for answers, highlighting the field of ethnobiology p.61. The appeal of this is exaggerated as it stretches across Hodges' model diametrically [sociology - sciences]. I'm still on the look out for models possessed of an 'otherness', that retain legitimacy, validity where and for whom they are employed. (There is much to debate there still.) The objective and subjective dimensions also loom large. I remember a meeting concerned with nursing terminology 1990s, with reflection on the terms used for injection across the UK. That in itself demonstrated wide regional variations that also give pause for thought.

More to follow, with Part 2 'case studies'.

Murphy, Gregory L. Categories we live by: how we classify everyone and everything. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2024.

Many thanks to MIT Press for the review copy.

See also:

Categories are destiny' Freud p.6. of 'Categories we live by'

Book review: 'Categories we live by' ii

Book review iv: 'Categories we live by'

v Book review: 'Categories we live by'

Book review: 'Categories we live by' ii

In that first post I felt a bit guilty getting bogged down in the introduction, and not really saying much about the book itself.

Well, Chapter 1 is the 'Introduction' so that is great, and as you may be I am swept up by what's between the covers. Speaking of which, this is an effective design, and green colour; especially for a northern reading in March - May.

The book is slim considering the topic, 164 pages, plus just over a page of notes, four and a half of references and an index. It is, I think a slightly larger format paperback but fits well in the hands for outdoors reading. The fonts and layout are clear.

Murphy's style is straightforward and readable. It is not technical, but includes terms such as classification, nomenclature, and domain [ ;-) ]. The division into two parts, lends itself to a wide readership, the second part providing case studies giving the book a pragmatic, practical emphasis. I'll post again about chapters 6 & 7 on Psychodiagnostic Categories; and Categories and Power respectively (brief, but a joy!).

Before moving on from the Intro, Murphy explains how the same category may be thought of in different ways at different times' and encourages us to be 'critical of our categories'. p.12. This stands out for me. Especially being suitably equipped to critique our categories as we use them.

Chapter 2 on The Classical Tradition, has a natural starting point; describing Aristotle (with his book Categories), essences, definitions with properties that are necessary and sufficient p.14-15.

'Necessity: If it's in the category, it has the features,
Sufficiency: If it has the features, it's in the category.' p.15.

I was prompted to reflect on relations and identities here. While I suggested the book is not technical, there is a important point about dictionaries and the definitions we seek there. We should remember that many members of the public would still rely on what is the classical way to create, confirm category membership: there must be a rule.

Wittgenstein follows pp.17-20, but I took note of:

'The problem is that necessity and sufficiency are in tension with each
other. As you make the list of properties longer and longer, it's more likely
to be sufficient but less likely to be necessary. Forming a list of features that
are both necessary and sufficient is usually impossible.' p.19.

I pencilled in (Eleanor) Rosch on p.13, and on page 21 her contribution to the destruction of the classical world is described; with other researchers. The book is well referenced, without being intrusive. Murphy provides specific pointers, suggesting further reading and skipping a chapter. Helpful, given how precious time is these days.

There is a critical invitation on page 13: 

'Want to start an argument with someone? Ask them whether a stove is a kitchen utensil or nursing is a science.'

I wonder if nursing theory colleagues in the United States and globally have already responded?

More to follow - surely!

Murphy, Gregory L. Categories we live by: how we classify everyone and everything. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2024.

Many thanks to MIT Press for the review copy.

Safety testing time - evaluations - for users of Hodges' model to be extended

The time to test Hodges' model* is to be extended (in my dreams...).

Or. Do not underestimate 'simple' models.

The time to evaluate Hodges' model:

• for individual users
• cross-curricula
• professional groups (e.g. registered mental health; and general nurses)
• within multidisciplinary / skilled teams / venues (Nursing home, Community Mental Health Team)

Given the universal, multicontextual scope of the model for public and patient safety it was decided to extend the time for testing by a further month to two quarters [ 😉] - six whole calendar months.

When applied it is important that checkpoints are agreed:

• Data gathering - initial interview
• initial formulation / care plan
• care review / evaluation
• discharge - staying well 

There is no agreed standard for testing a generic model in healthcare. Is there?

• Not for the medical / bio-medical model
• Nor, for the biopsychosocial model?

What chance then for a biopsychosociopolitical model?

*Per user and group of users of course.

My source: 
Christina Criddle, Concerns raised after OpenAI slashes time taken to test potential risks of latest models, FTWeekend, 12-13 April, 2025, p.14. (italicised terms discussed).

See also:
Radhika Rajkumar, Editor. OpenAI used to test its AI models for months - now it's days. Why that matters, ZDNET.

https://www.zdnet.com/article/openai-used-to-test-its-ai-models-for-months-now-its-days-why-that-matters/

Call for Papers - Basic Needs: Normative Perspectives

Call for papers*

for a special issue on

Basic Needs: Normative Perspectives

(Editors: Lukas Meyer – Daniel Petz – Alessandro Pinzani)

Lessico di Etica Pubblica

http://www.eticapubblica.it/

 

In recent years the debate on basic needs and their place in normative theories of ethics and politics has been rekindled. This controversial concept has finally been openly adopted by authors who adopt different approaches to discuss issues of social justice. There are good reasons for this.

As a currency of justice, needs have several advantages. First, in contrast to preferences, desires, and some other currencies, basic needs are fully objective, i.e., whether a person has a basic need for a certain thing is independent of her own or anybody else’s mental attitudes towards that thing. A second important reason for preferring basic needs as the currency of justice is that they are also universal, although their definition might be culturally influenced. Thirdly, basic needs are intrinsically morally demanding: that P has a basic need for O by itself entails that P ought to be able to have, be, realize, etc. O. Finally, basic needs also have an important advantage in the particular context of sufficientarianism. One of the main objections against sufficientarianism is that it is unable to provide a plausible substantive specification of its threshold of sufficiency. The concept of basic needs, in contrast, essentially entails the idea of a qualitative difference. Being able to fulfill such needs takes precedence over being able to fulfill non-basic needs and desires. Moreover, it distinguishes a life that has a certain minimum quality from a life that lacks this quality.

We invite authors to explore these and other aspects of the concept of basic needs and its use for normative theories of social justice, including intergenerational justice.

Contributions can be in English, Italian, German, and French. The deadline is September 30, 2022

For inquiries please contact: Alessandro Pinzani <alepinzani AT gmail.com>

 

*currently.