Thoughts ii re. 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop
For me, applying Hodges' model I tend to place philosophy and psychiatry (mind, thought, belief, truth, intention ...) within the humanistic part of the model. So, Ewa Grzeszczak and - Philosophy of psychiatry and the methodology of social ontology - stood out. This is helpful as Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC) are a useful structure, spanning bio-mathematics. As suggested previously with 'equality', we can place the philosophical non-trivial question of kinds at the centre of Hodges' model and proceed (if possible?) from there.
The requirement for a holistic, integrative and pluralistic framework is there in literature. A statement supported by Alessandra Civani's talk: 'What kind of concept is ‘incongruence’? I located a paper:
Enactive psychiatry - A pragmatic and pluralistic approach to mental health and disease
- (and now have a copy c/o and thanks to Alessandra) and am grateful to being pointed to de Haan:
An Enactive Approach to PsychiatryI will (must) return to these papers. Earlier on Hodges' model, I'd opined (as on 'X') how the -
- medical
- biomedical
- bio-psycho-social models - are insufficient in the 21st century.
There was a thematic feel to the presentations with Anna Golova - Self-illness ambiguity without a self-illness distinction - following nicely. The styling on the slides was an added bonus. I located an informative (co-authored) paper by Golova:
‘Is it me or my illness?’: self-illness ambiguity as a useful conceptual lens for psychiatry'
Part of the power of Hodges' model derives not so much from its duality; as its dual axes. The two axes can encompass and handle the relatedness between/within reductionism, holist perspectives, the self and otherness, illness and health (well-being).
An hours break brought us to an event which was very well attended, clearly open to the public:
6-7pm Prof Miriam Solomon – Royal Institute of Philosophy talk ‘Stigma as an actant in the history of psychiatry’
In setting out the talk's structure I liked Prof. Solomon's reference to the common, implicit "grime" theory of the dynamic of stigma, and "punching down" as a strategy for managing stigma. 'Grime' made me think of sense of smell, the grime in my father's work van, a diesel. Now so many memories are evoked with the merest whiff. More positively, the patina of physical and mental life also came to mind. You would - might think stigma has been dealt with by now, but of course we are socio-politically far from it.
There is a related podcast from 2025, which also covers Prof. Solomon's early studies. A previous paper was also noted in the slides:
Stigma as an "actant" (cf. Bruno Latour's concept of an agent: causal role without intention)... DSM - ICD...If stigma disappeared tomorrow, the DSM would not have the same categories.Stigma (more specifically, its management) is shaping the conceptual space, with both scientific and moral consequences.
[Added 4th March...] On Friday - Sam Fellowes, took on, or has taken on - the non-trivial issue of - Modelling psychiatric diagnoses when self-diagnosing - how does this work? Complexity was acknowledged on the first slide, with self-diagnosis, and modelling, set against the Duhem-Quine thesis.
This technical aspect is welcome and no doubt essential given the socio-technical nature of diagnosis, touching as it does the public (society), primary care, psychiatry, service user groups, policymakers, informatics, and HM Treasury, amongst several 'stakeholders'. With the impact of the internet and social media, much (if not all?) of the vocabulary of mental health professionals has been co-opted and re-framed(?) by patient / service-user groups? It does not, for example, appear that the agency behind the DSM will be able to claim it back. Autism and ADHD were also discussed and debated. I located a previous chapter by Sam (pay-wall):
'As it is widely known, epistemic injustice was introduced by Fricker (2007) to unveil power relations that have negative consequences on people as epistemic agents. She distinguished in particular two different kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. The first kind occurs when a person (usually in a disadvantaged and oppressed role within the epistemic relation) is damaged as a knower because, as the name suggests, their testimony is overlooked, dismissed or invalidated. The second kind of epistemic injustice occurs when a person is deprived of the epistemic resources to even explain or articulate their experience of distress, or of systemic oppression. In connection to this, the concepts of neurodivergence and neurodiversity come from the political and social arena, and are born explicitly to contrast dominant pathologizing narratives in psychiatry.'
Gloria Ayob - Flourishing as mental health - was encouraging. 'TASK 1:EQUATION' a slide was titled, including emotional disorder is meta-evaluative; there are negative and positive poles, plus isomorphism between unpleasantness-pleasantness and disorder-health. I think my stomach was protesting I should have paid more attention. There is a blog post by Gloria: https://blog.oup.com/2024/12/the-concept-of-emotional-disorder/
After lunch Richard Hassall - Hermeneutical Injustice and Damaged Intellectual Self-Trust in Psychiatric Service Users, a reminder of the time and effort that needs to be put into public and patient involvement and engagement in mental health service (when this is desired). References included J.L. Austin and J.S. Bruner. A paper:
Scoping reviews are more common it seems: Lara Calabrese - Exploring epistemic injustice in dementia care: a scoping review and a qualitative study, plus paper [with QR code on the slide]:
All in all, a stimulating and enjoyable event.
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