Where is the Centeredness of Care?

In trying to see Hodges' model anew, which is quite a challenge after four decades; what of the model's structure?

It is easy to get carried away with mathematical terminology:

One line, add another, and they intersect, at a 90 degree right angle. So is centeredness to be found at the intersection point? 

If I'm tying myself up in knots well there's another possibility! 😉 

As a whole it appears the axes of the model are a manifold and not - in the center?

What do you think?

See also: 'What Is a Manifold?'

https://www.quantamagazine.org/what-is-a-manifold-20251103/

ii Thoughts re. Ecosia's AI Chat 'answer'

The previous post has been updated, to the prompt is added:

 'Please provide sources and references.

[If you are new here, and too Hodges' model please see the bibliography in the sidebar.] 

A 'human' reading (still) makes me wonder if the 'answer' is what I want to hear (as a user)? Is it worrying that the first provides a 'Conclusion' the latest does not. The table is helpful as I believe that Hodges' model has a role across research (and political!) -isms through methodologies and methods. The model can also encompass ('eat'!) aspects of scale, or level.

The reply still gives me quadraphonic joy (if read out-loud). Not only are the domains recognised, but the LLM/agent ai takes the intrapersonal / interpersonal in its stride (from the blog?). Subjects related to each of the domains are given in brackets. 

There is of course a bias (several) in the prompt, as the care domains were never intended to be comparable. It is positive that each domain is seen as having its own specific scope and function. Over twenty years notes were started on a paper on Hodges' model and its role/function in helping to define 'scope of practice'. Significantly, in the UK the rise of associate positions across disciplines has provoked much debate, vitriol (on X and union and lobbying) and soul searching in certain professional groups. Given the increasing importance of the global health and social care workforce this trend is reflected globally. A situation set to be extended with uncertainties and tensions exacerbated by artificial intelligence in practice.

Before 'explaining' the asymmetries (in points 1-4) it seems the domains are complementary (for all their differences), and provide a holistic underpinning for the model as a whole (my reading).

1. Scope and Focus 

Interesting, how the science and sociology domains are described as broad. Perhaps I am underestimating the depth/density of sociology, after all folk theory is found there? Unfortunately, we can also add a myriad of conspiracy theories? Sociology can also lay claim to quite a few constructions of its own. Including aesthetics as a bridge to architecture and design(?).

On 'X', Hodges' model has been described negatively as inviting / fostering generalism. So, this is a bad thing? Is it not strange then that your Advanced Nurse Practitioner, Consultant doctors (all specialities) and students cross-curricula can all use Hodges' model? The fact that my own responses were never engaged has helped train my thought. Here the relevance of the model to students and continued professional development is made through generalizable knowledge.

The response to the political domain is supportive, acknowledging resource allocation and the distinction between individual and collective (see for example):

S. Bettiol, P. Jones, H. A. Onyedikachi, and W. G. Kernohan, (2026) Bridging Gaps in Oral Health Frameworks: Mapping With Hodges' Health Career - Care Domains - Model, Journal of Public Health Dentistry. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/jphd.70034.  

I've seen tweets today regards IQ reductions in younger people. This is one reason for support of the top-left mental domain being designated as 'Intrapersonal – Interpersonal'. Our interpersonal skills and awareness are surely dependent upon our achieving a given level of inner mental life? Encouraging to see how subjectivity and objectivity is assigned too. Although, I think I'm in an echo chamber!

2. Epistemological Differences

In arguing for a model of health and social care that goes beyond:

• medical model;
• bio-medical model;
• bio-psycho-social model.

Reading 1-2 from the perspective of the Intrapersonal – Interpersonal domain you see how limiting this is, if an individual in a mental health/illness/mental capacity context can only point to sciences and sociological domains. Indeed, they may be relying guardians and advocates as they are unable to does this and raise the political matter of their rights. Without the POLITICAL domain (or as a result of it - neglect, structural racism) there is no law enshrining independent advocacy...

3. Practical Application in Care

To care is to act. Think about triage and emergency response.

Now in the 21st century 'care' must include self-care, health and social care, and (delayed or not you decide?) planetary care.

This necessitates a change of mindset at an individual and collective level. Consider the literacies that (again) young people must master to be effective, productive and happy citizens tomorrow?

So the following is a gift (in my eyes): 

"This means the intrapersonal-interpersonal domain is not just another 'content area' but a lens through which all other domains are experienced and integrated."

4. Hierarchy of Integration

'While the domains are conceptually equal in Hodges’ model' ..

This is interesting in itself.

[There does seem a emphasis upon the Intrapersonal – Interpersonal domain in this answer?]

This is quite a step, as the idea of a nexus and integration are picked up; and pointing to what are the determinants of health:

'For example:

• A scientific understanding of depression (e.g., serotonin levels) must be interpreted through the intrapersonal experience of the individual.
• A sociological analysis of healthcare disparities must be understood through the political structures that enable or inhibit change.
• A political decision about resource allocation must be filtered through intrapersonal values and priorities.'

I'm pleased I did this, as long as I'm not being trapped in an epistemological cocoon: otherwise known as a circle. Apart from a few occasions, I have not used AI/LLMs, perhaps it is time to explore more? I'd like to preserve my naivety, especially were maths is concerned. I'm not sure of what baggage I may pick up and lack the knowledge to interpret?

Previous post:  https://hodges-model.blogspot.com/2026/06/h2cm-domains-symmetry.html

[Updated] AI Chat: Are the domains of Hodges' model comparable?

In drafting a future post: 'The Sciences: points, lines, angles and perspectives on domains', I thought I would ask Ecosia's AI Chat a related question, here is the (quick) prompt and reply:

PROMPT: 
In Hodges' model there are four care, or knowledge domains. The four domains are the sciences, sociology, political, and intrapersonal – interpersonal domain. In terms of potential content are these domains comparable, or is there an essential asymmetry? Please provide sources and references.

(I have saved the prompt for future reference and refinement.)

RESPONSE: [updated 21st June 2026]

Hodges’ model (also known as the Health Career Model or h2cm) is a conceptual framework that organizes knowledge and care into four quadrants, each representing a distinct domain of human experience and knowledge. These domains are:

1. Sciences (empirical, biological, and physical sciences)
2. Sociology (social structures, relationships, and community)
3. Political (power, policy, governance, and resource allocation)
4. Intrapersonal – Interpersonal (psychological, emotional, and relational aspects of the self and others)

Are the Four Domains Comparable or Asymmetrical?

The four domains in Hodges’ model are not strictly symmetrical in terms of their content, scope, or application. While they are presented as equal in structure (each occupying one quadrant of the model), their potential content, theoretical foundations, and practical implications can vary significantly. Here’s why:

1. Differences in Scope and Focus

• Sciences (Quadrant 1):
  This quadrant focuses on empirical, measurable, and biological aspects of health and care, such as anatomy, physiology, and pathophysiology. Its content is often highly specialized, technical, and evidence-based, rooted in natural sciences like biology and chemistry.

  • Example: The role of hormones in stress response or the pathophysiology of diabetes.

• Sociology (Quadrant 2):
  This quadrant addresses social structures, culture, and community dynamics. Its content is broader and more interpretive, drawing from sociology, anthropology, and social psychology.

  • Example: The impact of socioeconomic status on health outcomes or the role of family support in recovery.

• Political (Quadrant 3):
  This quadrant examines power, policy, governance, and resource distribution. Its content is highly contextual and often contested, influenced by political science, economics, and public policy.

  • Example: The effect of healthcare policies on access to services or the role of advocacy in shaping health priorities.

• Intrapersonal – Interpersonal (Quadrant 4):
  This quadrant focuses on individual psychology, emotions, and relationships. Its content is highly subjective and variable, drawing from psychology, psychotherapy, and ethics.

  • Example: A patient’s personal beliefs about illness or the dynamics of a therapeutic relationship.

2. Differences in Methodology

• Sciences and Political domains often rely on quantitative methods (e.g., experiments, statistical analysis, policy evaluations).
• Sociology and Intrapersonal domains frequently use qualitative methods (e.g., interviews, case studies, ethnography).
• This methodological diversity can create asymmetry in how knowledge is generated, validated, and applied.

3. Differences in Practical Application

• Sciences and Political domains  are often system-level and influence macro-level decisions (e.g., clinical guidelines, healthcare policies).
• Sociology and Intrapersonal domains are more individual- or community-level, focusing on personalized care, cultural competence, and therapeutic relationships.
• This can lead to asymmetry in impact, where some domains (e.g., Political) shape broad systems, while others (e.g., Intrapersonal) focus on direct human experience.

4. Theoretical Foundations

• The Sciences and Political domains are grounded in positivist and structuralist theories, emphasizing objectivity and external reality.
• The Sociology and Intrapersonal domains are influenced by interpretivist and constructivist theories, emphasizing subjectivity and lived experience.
• This theoretical diversity can create asymmetry in how knowledge is perceived and valued in different contexts.

Is There an Essential Asymmetry?

Yes, there is an essential asymmetry in the potential content of the four domains. While the model presents them as equal in structure, their content, methods, applications, and theoretical foundations are not interchangeable. The domains complement each other but serve different purposes in understanding and delivering care.

Sources and References

1. Conceptual Overview of Hodges’ Model:

   • Hodges’ Model: A Cognitive Periplus for - WikiEducator (PDF)
   • Hodges’ Model: Welcome to the QUAD
   • Hodges’ Health Care Model as a Framework for Quality

2. Theoretical Foundations:

   • Hodges’ Health Career Model and its role and potential application
   • Hodges’ model: the Sustainable Development Goals and public health

3. Discussions on Asymmetry and Complementarity:

   • The model’s holistic intent is emphasized in Hodges’ Health Care Model as a Framework for Quality, but its quadrants are not identical in content or application.
   • The differences in methodology and scope are discussed in Hodges’ Health Career Model and its role and potential application.

Summary Table: Asymmetry in Hodges’ Model Domains

Domain	Content Focus	Methodology	Theoretical Foundation	Level of Application
Sciences	Biological, empirical data	Quantitative	Positivist	Macro (systems, clinical)
Sociology	Social structures, community	Qualitative/Quantitative	Interpretivist, Structuralist	Meso (groups, communities)
Political	Power, policy, governance	Quantitative/Qualitative	Structuralist, Critical Theory	Macro (systems, policy)
Intrapersonal-Interpersonal	Psychology, emotions, relationships	Qualitative	Constructivist, Humanistic	Micro (individual, relational)

PROMPT: 
In Hodges' model there are four care, or knowledge domains. The four domains are the sciences, sociology, political, and intrapersonal – interpersonal domain. In terms of potential content are these domains comparable, or is there an essential asymmetry?

 

In Hodges’ model, the four care (or knowledge) domains are:

1. Sciences (biological, physiological)
2. Sociology (social, cultural, environmental)
3. Political (legal, policy, organizational)
4. Intrapersonal – Interpersonal (psychological, emotional, relational)

These domains are not strictly comparable in terms of content, scope, or function. Instead, they represent complementary perspectives that together form a holistic framework for understanding human health, well-being, and care. Here’s why there is an essential asymmetry between them:

1. Scope and Focus

• Sciences and Sociology are broad, well-established academic disciplines with extensive theoretical and empirical foundations. They provide generalizable knowledge about biological processes and social systems.
• Political is more narrowly focused on power structures, governance, and resource allocation. While critical for systemic change, it is less about individual experience and more about collective frameworks.
• Intrapersonal – Interpersonal is deeply personal and subjective, focusing on individual psychology, emotions, and relationships. It is less about universal laws and more about unique, context-dependent experiences.

This makes the intrapersonal-interpersonal domain inherently asymmetrical compared to the others, as it deals with subjectivity and variability rather than objective or structural phenomena.

2. Epistemological Differences

• Sciences, Sociology, and Political domains rely on external observation, measurement, and analysis. They are rooted in positivist or structuralist traditions, where knowledge is often generalized.
• Intrapersonal – Interpersonal is rooted in interpretivist and phenomenological traditions, where knowledge is co-created through subjective experience and dialogue. It resists universal generalization.

This creates a fundamental asymmetry in how knowledge is produced and validated across the domains.

3. Practical Application in Care

• The Sciences, Sociology, and Political domains provide frameworks for action (e.g., medical treatments, social policies, legal rights). They are instrumental in shaping systems and interventions.
• The Intrapersonal – Interpersonal domain is transformative—it shapes how individuals perceive, interpret, and respond to care. It is the domain where meaning is made and agency is exercised.

This means the intrapersonal-interpersonal domain is not just another “content area” but a lens through which all other domains are experienced and integrated.

4. Hierarchy of Integration

While the domains are conceptually equal in Hodges’ model, in practice, the intrapersonal-interpersonal domain often acts as the nexus where the other domains intersect. For example:

• A scientific understanding of depression (e.g., serotonin levels) must be interpreted through the intrapersonal experience of the individual.
• A sociological analysis of healthcare disparities must be understood through the political structures that enable or inhibit change.
• A political decision about resource allocation must be filtered through intrapersonal values and priorities.

This integrative role makes the intrapersonal-interpersonal domain asymmetrical in function, even if not in formal status.

Conclusion: Essential Asymmetry

The four domains are not comparable in content or function. Instead:

• The Sciences, Sociology, and Political domains provide structural and systemic knowledge.
• The Intrapersonal – Interpersonal domain provides subjective and relational knowledge, which is essential for meaning-making and agency.

The asymmetry arises from the epistemological and practical differences between objective/systemic knowledge and subjective/experiential knowledge. Hodges’ model emphasizes that all domains are necessary, but they operate in fundamentally different ways.

Glossaries - calques, standards and what is, or can be canonical?

Post Marrakech and WCCS26 I'm still contemplating on matters 'complex' and 'complexity', across complex systems and complex care. We humans (and this one in-particular) have a penchant for compunding complexity, adding complications. Our languages are a case in point. 

As the conference demonstrated mathematical is central to the discovery of chaotic and complex systems. Maths itself preempted the discovery of the Lorenz System, and the Mandelbrot Set.

Efforts to look at Hodges' model mathematically has resulted in a small draft comparative glossary (4-5 terms). In addition to the history of chemistry and its adaptation of mathematical symbols, I soon came across complex numbers, complex dynamics, complex mathematics (don't worry I know my limits). But, symplectic geometry! What is that?

Apparently, 'The term "symplectic" is a calque of "complex" introduced by Hermann Weyl in 1939.'
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symplectic).

So, over decades of ward meetings, reviews, care plans it was symplectic patients, symplectic care and situations all the time? Where am I heading with this? Probably nowhere in particular. There's still the risk of a meeting c/o gravity with the floor. I've been fascinated with the way words such as design and architecture are conjoined and added to things that do not qualify, at least from the purists perspective. This is joy of languages, they change constantly. 

Familiar with 'standard' in the clinical and informatics sense; 'canonical (form)' has come up within maths. It occurs in health too:

Graham, M., Winter, A. K., Ferrari, M., Grenfell, B., Moss, W. J., Azman, A. S., Metcalf, C. J. E., & Lessler, J. (2019). Measles and the canonical path to elimination. Science, 364(6440), 584–587. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26649426 

Sepehri, A. (2015). A Critique of Grossman’s Canonical Model of Health Capital. International Journal of Health Services, 45(4), 762–778. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45140527

Lee, H.-S., Paik, M. C., & Lee, J. H. (2009). Estimating a Multivariate Familial Correlation Using Joint Models for Canonical Correlations: Application to Memory Score Analysis from Familial Hispanic Alzheimer’s Disease Study. Biometrics, 65(2), 463–469. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25502307 

Voit, E. O. (2000). Canonical Modeling: Review of Concepts with Emphasis on Environmental Health. Environmental Health Perspectives, 108, 895–909. https://doi.org/10.2307/3454323 

 

Goddu, A. (1985). The Effect of Canonical Prohibitions on the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages. Medizinhistorisches Journal, 20(4), 342–362. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25803849

 In drawing up a glossary, and starting with a blank sheet (that is not Hodges' model) this is all worth consideration. Could Hodges' model find a place as a canonical form - even clinically?

CFP: Nonsense in Language and Thought

Guest editor: 
Krystian Bogucki (Polish Academy of Sciences)

Deadline for submissions: 
the 31st of July 2026 

Description:

Studia Semiotyczne (Semiotic Studies) invites submissions for a special issue of the journal. Papers should be written in English and prepared for blind review. 

An interest in nonsense was a hallmark of the early analytic philosophy. Bertrand Russell (1908) thought that a theory of nonsense could help us avoid some daunting paradoxes in logic. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922, 1953) and Rudolf Carnap (1931) recognised nonsense as a fundamental concept for philosophical criticism. They claimed that much of philosophical discourse is defective in the most fundamental way: it is neither true nor false, it does not consist of thoughts and propositions ? it is nonsense. According to the early Wittgenstein, philosophers want to describe the nature of the world, thought, language and ethics, but they unwittingly fall into nonsense. The Tractatus was supposed to free us from this troublesome position by presenting a perspicuous notation. On the other hand, the later Wittgenstein claimed that we should compare deceptive philosophical images with our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking in order to avoid nonsense. Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday, so we must always remember the everyday use of concepts. For Carnap, propositions should be reducible to sense data and constructed according to the rules of logical syntax in order to be meaningful. 

Later, the topic of nonsense was discussed by Alfred Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, Willard V. O. Quine, Arthur Prior, Richard Routley and Georg H. von Wright, among others. Since the late 1970s, however, the interest in nonsense has faded. Only recently, some important works have been published. The first important stimulus came from foundational works on theories of nonsense (Cappelen 2012, 2013; Camp 2004; Glock 2015; Magidor 2009, 2013). The second source of the revival of interest in nonsense was Wittgenstein scholarship on the austere and substantial conceptions of nonsense (Conant 2001; Diamond 1995, 2005; Glock 2004; Hacker 2003; Moore 2003; Sullivan 2003). Some works also examined the relation of nonsense to other phenomena (Gotham 2017, Keller and Keller 2021, Shaw 2015, Sorensen 2003). 

The important questions to be addressed in the forthcoming volume are (to name but a few):

• What are the sources of nonsense? 
• Are some parts of philosophical and non-philosophical discourse nonsense?
• What is the relation between nonsense and figurative speech?
• Is it at all possible to be wrong whether our own thoughts are meaningful? 

We hope that the special issue of Studia Semiotyczne will further strengthen and deepen the scholarly interest in nonsense. 

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

Theories of nonsense
Nonsense and logical syntax
Nonsense and category mistakes
Nonsense and figurative speech (e.g. metaphor, metonymy)
Nonsense and fiction
History of the concept of nonsense (in particular Wittgenstein's and the Vienna Circle's views on nonsense)
Nonsense and understanding
Nonsense and illusions of sense
Nonsense and quantification
Nonsense and linguistics
Nonsense and ineffability
Nonsense, knowledge-how and knowledge-that
Logics of nonsense
Nonsense and semantic paradoxes
How to diagnose philosophical nonsense?
Metaphilosophical and methodological issues concerning nonsense

In order to submit the paper one is kindly asked to submit the manuscript by sending it to:
krystian.bogucki AT ifispan.edu.pl and studiasemiotyczne AT pts.edu.pl 

All submitted papers will be double-blind peer-reviewed.

My source (and emphasis):
Philos-L "The Liverpool List" is run by the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool 
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/

Wittgenstein's - Tractatus

Apparently, Wittgenstein walked away from philosophy after publication of the Tractatus. He thought he had solved the problems of philosophy, logic and reality.

In trying to ‘see’ Hodges’ model, in mathematical terms, there may be lessons in Wittegenstein’s approach, both in content and style. Of course, as a non-mathematician, I probably should leave well-alone; and stick to nursing. But that is the problem: from 1987-88 there is a need for a different perspective, even if this is a personal challenge. As with many ‘reviews’ here, we can look at Wittengenstein’s work, reflect upon it, and consider how it relates to the purposes, structures and content of Hodges’ model.

The Tractatus’s first line then, offers a warm welcome.

‘The world is everything that is the case.’ [I]

Making the decision to become a nurse and enrolling as a student makes you an educational and workforce demographic case.

Once a student in the university lecture theatre, you hopefully whether consciously, or not are exposed to the theory – practice gap; as you yearn to be on your first placement. Now it you who is seeking ‘cases’. As we live, and statistics roll and tally, the question of caseness (and categories) is key, one that is carried around even if not always active, recognised as such.

As noted in the previous post, we can for Hodges’ model (and other models, frameworks it must be said) think of ‘case’ as a, or the situation. 

A mathematical approach to Hodges’ model involves looking at things, concepts, people as objects. This includes patients and carers. In terms of a project worthy of pursuing in nursing and other disciplines involved in healthcare, this mathematization presents a non-trivial challenge. A fully-deserved response would be: 'What have you done to the aptitude for care and caring attitude? You've cancelled - subtracted it!' Humour aside:

'In order to know an object, I must know not its external but all its internal qualities.' [2.01231] 

Is this equivalent to us getting to know our patient / client and their socio-political context? 

‘The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact.’ [2.032] 

It is a help that Wittgenstein points to structure (crumbs of understanding are welcome here, as incremental steps). In formulating Hodges’ model we first identify the axes. It is the axes that then provide a space, four domains in total, to frame the objects that we decide; or, as the situation dictates, what concepts are placed in the domains of Hodges' model.

There is a successive series that follows, combining place, space and logic: ‘The proposition determines a place in logical space: the existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the existence of the constituent parts alone, by the existence of the significant proposition.’ [3.4]

‘The propositional sign and the logical coordinates : that is the logical place.’ [3.41]

‘The geometrical and the logical place agree in that each is the possibility of an existence.’ [3.411]

‘Although a proposition may only determine one place in logical space, the whole logical space must already be given by it.
(Otherwise denial, the logical sum, the logical product. etc., would always introduce new elements -in co-ordination.) 
(The logical scaffolding round the picture determines the logical space. The proposition reaches through the whole logical space.)' [3.42]

While Wittgenstein came to view ‘the picture theory of meaning’ as incorrect, as a conceptual framework and diagrammatic resource Hodges’ model is closely tied to this form of representation.

Of course, the logic at work here, is far from mathematical, but there is surely a logic.

'Formal concepts cannot, like proper concepts, be presented by a function.' [4.126]

'There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world'".
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world.' [5.641] 

'Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures, geometry can obviously say nothing about their actual form and position. But the network is purely geometrical, and all its properties can be given a priori.

Laws, like the law of causation, etc., treat of the network and not of what the network describes.' [6.35]

There is much more in this work, and much that remains a challenge. Many commentators have written and said in interviews that the Tractatus rewards re-reading and some sentences stay with you for life (The Great Philosophers BBC TV). 

I'm still seeking mine.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf

iv WCCS26: World Conference on Complex Systems 20-22nd April

Day 1: Panel 2 - Rethinking Knowledge in the Age of Complexity

• Helena Knyazeva - Dancing with Complexity: How the World Thinks Through Us
• Carlos Gershenson - The Implications of Complexity
• Leonardo Rodríguez Zoya - Can Statistics Think? Complexity, Future, and Freedom in the Age of Large Language Models
  Panel Chair: Nigel Gilbert 

Courage is one of the 6Cs in nursing, and was on display at WCCS26.

Carlos Gershon began by offering two references, the first:

De Domenico, et al., (2019). Complexity explained: A grassroot collaborative initiative to create a set of essential concepts of complex systems. https://complexityexplained.github.io

This is a brief 20 pages, larger text, and provides a helpful primer to complexity and related concepts covering:

Interactions
Emergence 
Dynamics 
Self-organization
Adaptation
Interdisciplinarity
Methods

For each concept, the authors explain:

Definition/Description
Examples
Relevant Concepts
References

Plus, secondly:

Gershenson, C. The Implications of Interactions for Science and Philosophy. Found Sci 18, 781–790 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9305-8

I liked the practical feel here, the encouragement to think anew, and perhaps taste the "flavors of emergence": synchronic - space; diachronic - time, weak and strong feedback, transversal of scale - upwards and downwards.

There is further conference on complexity later this year (and also online!):

CCS 2026:
The 2026 Conference on Complex Systems
OCTOBER 9 - 16, 2026 BINGHAMTON, NY, USA & ONLINE

In my search I also found:

Carlos Gershenson; Complexity, Artificial Life, and Artificial Intelligence. Artif Life 2025; 31 (3): 289–303. doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00462

Gershenson, C. Self-organizing systems: what, how, and why?. npj Complex 2, 10 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44260-025-00031-5

Leonardo Rodríguez Zoya's presentation helpfully connected social practice, interdisciplinary bridges, statistical rationality, complex (human) rationality and the future(s): desirable, possible, latent and probable.

individual

|

INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES

humanistic ------------------------------- mechanistic

SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL

|

group

COMPLEX (HUMAN) RATIONALITY   cognition	STATISTICAL RATIONALITY Techopraxis LLMs - technology
socio- HUMAN PROBLEMS SOCIAL PRACTICE PRACTICE (one of the 4Ps)	ELECTION - CAMPAIGN SPENDING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS ISLAND ECONOMY CRYPTOCURRENCY

To answer the prompt - 

"Give me a less likely but more fruitful interpretation of this [concept]*."

*Replace with a significant concept in your practice

Would it might help to have a simple, and yet complexity (and simplicity!) primed conceptual framework to assist reflection, argumentation, and progress?

 

I missed the poster at the afternoon break, and followed track 1. I greatly enjoyed Julian Arevalo's - Adaptive Readiness: an Agent-Based Model of Peace Negotiations. Perhaps this accounts for my having no notes or photos for this track except for one. I realise now we did speak, sitting together for the conference dinner. I'm sure I remember Negotiation Lab 1.0 - 

https://www.comses.net/codebases/1256dc74-9ae4-4f49-a235-1ec129be1930/releases/1.0.0/

 

This past week I heard discussion (BBC Radio 4) of the 'income' Norway obtains from its expertise and engagement in peace negotiations.

 

Nicholas Roxburgh, and colleagues Rachel Creaney, Mindi Premarathne and Ruth Wilson through 
Exploring Interdependencies in an Island Economy, reminded me of public engagement in research. Especially when it involves their community; and that community is somewhat rural, or remote.

 

Remah Dahdoul, with Jan Korbel and Stefan Thurner presented -

Campaign-Spending Driven Polarization Transition in a Double-Random Field Model of Elections. The following paper brings home the mathematics in complex systems. The reference is:

 

Jan Korbel and Remah Dahdoul and Stefan Thurner. (2026) Empirical validation of the polarization transition in a double-random field model of elections. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.00612.  doi.org/10.1103/9gjj-1df6.

 

The paper by Saida Hachimi El Idrissi and Mohamed Nemiche is not open access, but the abstract follows. 

 

S. H. El Idrissi and M. Nemiche, "Formation of Complex Societies: An Agent-Based Model Inspired by Freudian Theory," 2024 World Conference on Complex Systems (WCCS), Mohammedia, Morocco, 2024, pp.1-6, doi: 10.1109/WCCS62745.2024.10765573.

Abstract: The rise and emergence of complex societies in the Old World mark a pivotal chapter in human history, characterized by the transition from small, kin-based communities to large, hierarchical states. This transformation raises fundamental questions: How did human societies progress from small, cohesive groups characterized by face-to-face cooperation to the expansive, anonymous societies of today, often organized as states? What factors account for the significant variation in different human populations' capacity to construct stable and functional state structures? To address these questions, we developed an agent-based model grounded in Freud's hypothesis, which posits that civilization could neither emerge nor evolve without the repression of human desires. In the context of social evolution, this repression of desires can be interpreted as the repression of intra-societal competition, ultimately strengthening the society and facilitating the formation of complex social structures. We implemented this model within a realistic representation of the Afroeurasian landmass, incorporating various geographical factors. To validate our model, we compared our simulated results with historical data. The model-predicted pattern of expansion of complex societies demonstrated remarkable congruence with the observed historical patterns in the Old World. The emergence, growth, and distribution of large-scale societies predicted by our computational model showed remarkable consistency with the archaeological and historical record.

keywords: {Analytical models; Computational modeling; Predictive models; Data models; Agriculture; Rivers; History; Complex systems; component; Agent-based Modeling; Repression of satisfaction; cooperation; competition; Social Simulation},
URL: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=10765573&isnumber=10765499 

Unless you are a microsurgeon (increasingly with robotic co-workers), is the word practice, more likely to manifest what is larger, the big picture, a sense of space, even at a societal or continental scale? In reading, I came across four forms of attractors. For me, how they fit into the question of scale makes this paper worthy of seeking out. 

M. Nemiche was unable to attend the conference, and was greatly missed.

iii Picking up sticks: when axes matter

It is one thing for us to break the stick, but quite another from a concept's perspective. They are accustomed to the dynamics at work, when as search terms they are exploded, or not. And, not just any concept but one that can be unique. Consider the concept, and how or where it finds itself [ in Hodges' or another model ]? Let us use the intra-INTERPERSONAL domain, as an example, and ask:

1. Is 'mood' fixed by the I-axis alone?
2. Does the humanistic axis have a role in where in the doomain the user of Hodges' model places 'mood'?
3. Acknowledging person-centredness, if the patient/client had a view, to what extent would this agree (with annonymity assured) with the professional's judgement, or a relatives / guardian?
4. What is as a result, 'mood' has become 'very low mood'? (To continue in this vein , invites complication, but we will continue.)
5. Introducing the 'Other' whatever their role and relationship, pushes us to the humanistic, but whether this is achieved in a person-centred manner (triage excluded) is a matter of opinion and judgement (evaluation).

If mood is fixed by the I-axis then if we determine the issue is 'low mood' are we introducing a combined quantitative and qualitative dimension, a continuum, at the selected point in the interpersonal domain? Writing previously about threshold concepts, I wondered, and proposed compound threshold concepts. There is a progression from the patient's subjective self-assessment, to in all likelihood of an objective measure being introduced, so spanning two domains. Definition of 'compound' aside; there is a compound structure at work.

What points 1-5 above reveal is triangulation. When it is argued that Hodges' model facilitates navigation as per my presentation on 21st April, this is a strategy from mixed-methods research in practice. Many years ago, Hodges' model was described as a 'cognitive periplus', reflecting the way ancient mariners initially charted the coastlines creating the first map, as per their culture and dispora. In the west more recently the value of social approaches and activities, especially in mental health. Care navigation is a role. Literally sign-posting to individually suited (which must be stressed) activities, resources, and agencies. So, in Hodges' model what are our three triangulation points? They are:

1. Axial;
2. Intra- InterDomain; 
3. Person-centred. 

Perhaps, we can describe 1-2 as conceptual anchors at least when dealing with a concept, while #3 is more about approach, values and philosophy. So, there is something of a 'cheat' going on, because each one is compound:

1. Axial: The axial is comprised of four points. The axes create a Cartesian plane (figure). And, as far as a patient is concerned, they mark off a point on the respective Individual and Humanistic-Sciences parts of the axes. This form of triangulation point can claim a general conceptual precision (language) in the applied terminal labels; but what happens in-between can be patently fuzzy. A mix of what may be objective and subjective.

2. Intra- Interdomain: This may be the most imprecise triangulation point. It appears the axes of Hodges' model are composite (figure). They have two-sides as a boundary. To be pedantic, in our example, one plays to the interpersonal domain, the other the sciences.

[The relationship between the axis and the domains in Hodges' model, is far from unique; but I wonder if there is something else here?]

2. Person-Centred: There is a paradoxical nature to person-centred(ness). It is also nebulous in nature, and yet in care it is definitive in practice (safety, purposes, values, professionalism, competency, ...).  It forms locus which can also be classed as a traingulation point, at the centre of the model. This is the point around which Hodges' model is built. This captures the individual's (life, care) context and situation, all influenced by their life chances as consequent health - and other - careers. Salience and our attention^ is key. Is it possible to frame our purpose(s)?

^A focus for [N] autumn.

Marrakech, Le Jardin Secret. 24th April. 1000-1830.

Information Design and Sense-Making c/o Dervin

'Information Design: Something New, Something Old

... I want in this chapter to challenge the central idea that information design is a new idea. Reducing the issues briefly to a polarity, it is useful to start by considering two ways to conceptualize information. One way, implicit in the above assumptions, is that information is something that describes an ordered reality and has some knowable, or at least idealized, isomorphic relationship to that reality (i.e., it represents in an identical way the form and content of reality). In short, information instructs us, this assumption says, about the nature of the world we live in: its history, its future, its functioning, our place in it, our possible
actions, and the potential consequences of those actions.' p.35.

[My emphasis.]

Brenda Dervin. Chaos, Order, and Sense-Making: A Proposed Theory for Information Design (chapter 3) In R. Jacobson (Ed.), Information Design (pp. 35-57). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press

Previously: Information design: Tufte & Raskin 

Thoughts ii re. 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop

For me, applying Hodges' model I tend to place philosophy and psychiatry (mind, thought, belief, truth, intention ...) within the humanistic part of the model. So, Ewa Grzeszczak and - Philosophy of psychiatry and the methodology of social ontology - stood out. This is helpful as Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC) are a useful structure, spanning bio-mathematics. As suggested previously with 'equality', we can place the philosophical non-trivial question of kinds at the centre of Hodges' model and proceed (if possible?) from there.

The requirement for a holistic, integrative and pluralistic framework is there in literature. A statement supported by Alessandra Civani's talk: 'What kind of concept is ‘incongruence’? I located a paper:

Enactive psychiatry - A pragmatic and pluralistic approach to mental health and disease

- (and now have a copy c/o and thanks to Alessandra) and am grateful to being pointed to de Haan:

An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry

 I will (must) return to these papers. Earlier on Hodges' model, I'd opined (as on 'X') how the -

• medical
• biomedical
• bio-psycho-social models - are insufficient in the 21st century.

There was a thematic feel to the presentations with Anna Golova - Self-illness ambiguity without a self-illness distinction - following nicely. The styling on the slides was an added bonus. I located an informative (co-authored) paper by Golova:

‘Is it me or my illness?’: self-illness ambiguity as a useful conceptual lens for psychiatry'

Part of the power of Hodges' model derives not so much from its duality; as its dual axes. The two axes can encompass and handle the relatedness between/within reductionism, holist perspectives, the self and otherness, illness and health (well-being).

An hours break brought us to an event which was very well attended, clearly open to the public:

6-7pm Prof Miriam Solomon – Royal Institute of Philosophy talk ‘Stigma as an actant in the history of psychiatry’

In setting out the talk's structure I liked Prof. Solomon's reference to the common, implicit "grime" theory of the dynamic of stigma, and "punching down" as a strategy for managing stigma. 'Grime' made me think of sense of smell, the grime in my father's work van, a diesel. Now so many memories are evoked with the merest whiff. More positively, the patina of physical and mental life also came to mind. You would - might think stigma has been dealt with by now, but of course we are socio-politically far from it.

There is a related podcast from 2025, which also covers Prof. Solomon's early studies. A previous paper was also noted in the slides:

Solomon, M. (2025). The Elusiveness of Hermeneutic Injustice in Psychiatric Categorizations. Social Epistemology, 39(2), 166–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2024.2400068

 

Discussion of the DSM inevitably followed (and in the above podcast). In questions the 'reality' of severe mental illness, and suggestion of the acute challenge of managing the negative symptoms of psychoses.

 

Prof. Solomon's conclusion was well worth waiting for, including:

Stigma as an "actant" (cf. Bruno Latour's concept of an agent: causal role without intention)... DSM - ICD...

 

If stigma disappeared tomorrow, the DSM would not have the same categories. 

 

Stigma (more specifically, its management) is shaping the conceptual space, with both scientific and moral consequences.

[Added 4th March...] On Friday - Sam Fellowes, took on, or has taken on - the non-trivial issue of - Modelling psychiatric diagnoses when self-diagnosing - how does this work? Complexity was acknowledged on the first slide, with self-diagnosis, and modelling, set against the Duhem-Quine thesis. 

This technical aspect is welcome and no doubt essential given the socio-technical nature of diagnosis, touching as it does the public (society), primary care, psychiatry, service user groups, policymakers, informatics, and HM Treasury, amongst several 'stakeholders'. With the impact of the internet and social media, much (if not all?) of the vocabulary of mental health professionals has been co-opted and re-framed(?) by patient / service-user groups? It does not, for example, appear that the agency behind the DSM will be able to claim it back. Autism and ADHD were also discussed and debated. I located a previous chapter by Sam (pay-wall):

Fellowes S. Self-Diagnosis in Psychiatry and the Distribution of Social Resources. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 2023;94:55-76. doi:10.1017/S1358246123000218

 

This really is a thicket of thorns, it spreads as and wherever you go.

 

The welfare bill is such that there should have been government Ministers in attendance. I have responded on behalf of clients to PIP assessments. Agencies have invited me to interview for 'Disability Assessor' roles. Not only is this a complex web, but several logics obtain: a perverse temporal logic operates, binary logic and a fixed mindset can develop so that some (vulnerable!?) individuals can get stuck. Perhaps, a social imperative steps in and disrupts, life chances: their being a NEET ('a young person who is no longer in the education system and who is not working or being trained for work'. Ecosia) is better for someone else? 

 

To unpick, make sense of this, you need a foundational universal model.

 

There is a (co-authored) paper from Giulia Russo, who presented - Epistemic and political role of experience: https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTPO-112 from which:

'As it is widely known, epistemic injustice was introduced by Fricker (2007) to unveil power relations that have negative consequences on people as epistemic agents. She distinguished in particular two different kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. The first kind occurs when a person (usually in a disadvantaged and oppressed role within the epistemic relation) is damaged as a knower because, as the name suggests, their testimony is overlooked, dismissed or invalidated. The second kind of epistemic injustice occurs when a person is deprived of the epistemic resources to even explain or articulate their experience of distress, or of systemic oppression. In connection to this, the concepts of neurodivergence and neurodiversity come from the political and social arena, and are born explicitly to contrast dominant pathologizing narratives in psychiatry.'

In seeking some 'test' cases to try to model relationally, Hodges' model suggests at least four - without letting the care / knowledge domains wag-the-dog. Giulia's talk was very helpful, ranging across forms of epistemic injustice (addressed by others too), identity, neurodivergence, lived experience, self-, counter- and collective narratives with references. A great resource.

 

Frank Denning, reminded me of an important phenomena, in Using Stebbing’s Directional Analysis to Evaluate ‘Mentalizing’. Talking therapies, or more properly referral to talking therapies often presents several criteria that would-be subjects must 'pass'. An ability to mentalize, can represent one. This is understanable, for effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy ... it is to be found in the manual. But, in terms of power relations, gate keeping in various forms is a literal (virtual) key to service access. Hodges' model is no different (sigh!). At what age can people start to use Hodges' model? What mentalization is involved to cognitively engage in use of Hodges' model? 

 

I struggled to obtain a copy of Stebbing's original work from 1930, but see how closely tied the work is to physics. An Internet Archive copy is poor quality. The search will continue, as I suspect there are links to Bill Ross's text on Deleuzian cosmology. It is marvellous that work from 1930 resonates today. There is: 

Janssen-Lauret, F. (Accepted/In press). Directional Analysis in Susan Stebbing’s Philosophy of Physics. In S. Chapman (Ed.), Susan Stebbing on Logic and Analysis Springer Nature. 

https://pure.manchester.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/338653274/Directional_Analysis_in_Susan_Stebbing_s_Philosophy_of_Physics_Final_.pdf

Gloria Ayob - Flourishing as mental health - was encouraging. 'TASK 1:EQUATION' a slide was titled, including emotional disorder is meta-evaluative; there are negative and positive poles, plus isomorphism between unpleasantness-pleasantness and disorder-health. I think my stomach was protesting I should have paid more attention. There is a blog post by Gloria: https://blog.oup.com/2024/12/the-concept-of-emotional-disorder/

After lunch Richard Hassall - Hermeneutical Injustice and Damaged Intellectual Self-Trust in Psychiatric Service Users, a reminder of the time and effort that needs to be put into public and patient involvement and engagement in mental health service (when this is desired). References included J.L. Austin and J.S. Bruner. A paper:

Hassall R. Sense-making and hermeneutical injustice following a psychiatric diagnosis. J Eval Clin Pract. 2024 Aug;30(5):848-854. doi: 10.1111/jep.13971. Epub 2024 Feb 20. PMID: 38375925.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jep.13971 

Scoping reviews are more common it seems: Lara Calabrese - Exploring epistemic injustice in dementia care: a scoping review and a qualitative study, plus paper [with QR code on the slide]:

Calabrese L, Brigiano M, Quartarone M, Chirico I, Trolese S, Lambiase F, Forte L, Annini A, Bortolotti L, Chattat R. I'm still here and my opinion matters: a scoping review on the experience of epistemic injustice among people living with dementia. Curr Psychol. 2025 Dec 17;45(1):s12144-025-08519-y. doi: 10.1007/s12144-025-08519-y. PMID: 41445984; PMCID: PMC7618523.

 

The paper's title here brought to mind the radio programme "Does He Take Sugar?" Questions followed regards the studies methods. Since leaving I wondered if there has been an evaluation of Dementia Friendly Communities? Are there dots to usefully joined there?

 

The final talk was delivered (with gusto - pepped me up anyway) by Jacob Barlow - Epistemic borders: experts, communities, communication. Jacob's interest in pragmatism was apparent. I look forward to reading future work, and note Liverpool 2025: ‘Problems with Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Psychiatry’.

All in all, a stimulating and enjoyable event.

Thoughts re. 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop

After posting on the 19th February about the 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop last Thursday, 1100 through to 1530 on Friday - was well worth attending. I am also grateful for the opportunity to present Hodges' model, share current challenges and questions. Running through the programme what helped here:

While seemingly open in title the first presentation with Hane Maung, was (as with all) specific, but related to aspects of psychiatry and philosophy applicable here; classification, what is a 'disease'?, concepts, Millikan also appears in a reference: https://philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=MAUTDO-6.

As 2nd speaker, there were several questions after my presentation. Fourteen slides went to time: 20 minutes with 10 for Q&A. I'm not the best judge, but I believe I answered them. As my 'subject' is always the same in Hodges' model, I do make an effort to try (at least) to say something new. Listening, I soon realised this is an established Lancaster-grounded group, and welcoming too. If there is ever another opportunity, something new would definitely have to follow.

I can see scope for this in Matthew Williams's - The failure of the harm-minimisation argument for BID Surgery and the necessity of therapeutic justification. 'BIDS' is 'Body integrity dysphoria surgery' a challenging and ethics-bound situation, that while still rare, has made the news for (as ever) the wrong reasons. The relations to be considered cross all the domains and dimensions of health, care and more.

It is possible to become complacent regards our conceptual currency. Without taking care, we grow to take them for granted. I'm grateful to Clive Duddy for a refresh were autonomy is concerned.

'Difference' is a recurring trope in healthcare, informatics and other fields. George Turner's 'difference denied' and subsequent discussions was extra insightful therefore, addressing ongoing (legacy?) issues for service users, carers, patient and public involvement and engagement (PIE).

Presenting, 'Different ways of medical knowing in Walzer's different spheres of justice?', Dieneke Hubbeling drew my attention to Walzer's book: Spheres Of Justice: A Defense Of Pluralism And Equality. In addition capacity and capacities (to achieve an outcome), plus difference (again), especially when it comes to knowledge and knowing. I remember thinking about rather than putting the person at the centre of Hodges' model, place 'equality' and reflect upon that.

I note that we overlap with a journal too, and another topic - overtreatment - that was something of an elephant in the room (perhaps?): a further theme to follow - https://openaccess.sgul.ac.uk/id/eprint/113806/1/jep.13632.pdf

Ali Walker's Forget Fictionalism: Psychiatric Disorders are Quasi-Real,with a topological - cartographic themed slide perked me up later afternoon. The subject of Borderline Personality Disorder also reminded me of the extent of change in adult community mental health services, in practice through 1985-1995 and that encountered in 2019. Much to digest here. A 3 minute video of Ali's thesis BPD Disorder - Trauma is available from last year: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tMSyt71hvs

I will review/add more details here, or a new post.

Bridging Gaps in Oral Health Frameworks: Mapping With Hodges' Health Career - Care Domains - Model

 ABSTRACT

Objectives

Despite decades of national and global strategies, persistent inequities in oral health outcomes, access, and service provision remain. Existing frameworks often fail to integrate clinical and behavioral factors with social, cultural, and political determinants. This study aimed to map and evaluate oral health frameworks using Hodges' Health Career—Care Domains-Model (HCM), a meta-framework that spans clinical, behavioral, sociological, and political domains. The goal was to identify conceptual gaps and opportunities for greater integration.

Methods

A structured scoping review was conducted using MEDLINE, CINAHL, EBSCO, and search engine Google Scholar (1995–2025) to identify oral health-related conceptual frameworks. Frameworks were eligible if they addressed oral health determinants, behaviors, policies, or interventions. Two reviewers independently screened records and analyzed full-text articles. Frameworks were categorized by theoretical orientation and mapped against the four HCM domains to identify patterns of emphasis or omission.

Results

Of 226 identified records, 21 frameworks met inclusion criteria. These were classified into three thematic groups: balanced (addressing all domains), clinically led (focused on clinical/behavioral aspects), and policy/public health-focused (emphasizing sociological/political factors). Seven cross cutting themes emerged, including health promotion, systems integration, social justice, and cultural safety. While many frameworks promoted equity and policy reform, few offered implementation guidance or had been empirically validated.

Conclusions

HCM proved useful for systematically comparing frameworks and revealed consistent underrepresentation of political and structural domains. It offers a practical tool for oral health professionals, educators, and policymakers developing integrated oral health models that align with equity, sustainability, and universal health coverage goals.

S. Bettiol, P. Jones, H. A. Onyedikachi, and W. G. Kernohan, “ Bridging Gaps in Oral Health Frameworks: Mapping With Hodges' Health Career - Care Domains - Model,” Journal of Public Health Dentistry (2026): 1–14, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jphd.70034