Hodges' Model: Welcome to the QUAD: Search results for dsm

Hodges' model is a conceptual framework to support reflection and critical thinking. Situated, the model can help integrate all disciplines (academic and professional). Amid news items, are posts that illustrate the scope and application of the model. A bibliography and A4 template are provided in the sidebar. Welcome to the QUAD ...

Showing posts sorted by relevance for query dsm. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query dsm. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, July 01, 2013

Hodges' model - DSM V: the Politics of (Well-being (Health [Mental Health])) salience, books and domains

INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES
SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL

individual
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)
'salience' 
‘Salience syndrome’ replaces ‘schizophrenia’ in DSM-V and ICD-11: psychiatry’s evidence-based entry into the 21st century? J. Van Os

bereavement
medical, bio-psycho-social, recovery model
self-efficacy
self-stigma

DSM5 and Ethical Relativism

Ultimate terminology: 
self, person, patient, service user, client, 
Mr, Miss .....
Diagnostic process
'Evidence', objectivity, 
repeatability, validity, treatment, drugs
Credit Heidi Cartwright, Wellcome Images
The history of DSM: APA : Wikipedia
stigma
social services
social network (size, quality)
anti-psychiatry
social norms?

Media: Books review - essay;
Stevenson, T. (2013) Mind field, FT Weekend, May 25-26. p.8.
American Psychiatric Association APA

Opinion - commentary:

DSM-5: Caught between Mental Illness Stigma and Anti-Psychiatry Prejudice
(was on Scientific American)

Is Criticism of DSM-5 'Anti-psychiatry'?

Goldacre: Bad Pharma
.... and much more...

group - population

See also:
WHO History of the development of the International Classification of Diseases

Image: http://wellcomeimages.org/

Saturday, May 10, 2025

v Book review: 'Categories we live by'

Our lives and careers (hopefully) are full of bridges, some recognised, but not taken, others passed-by on our way (and unseen). Before I completed my training as a student mental health nurse beginning in 1977, I saw a critical bridge between the knowledge and skills on mental health nursing and general nursing. Crossing this bridge was essential (for me) to being a registered 'nurse'.

Chapter 6 on Psychodiagnostic Categories is a gift therefore. It's a gift because another bridge emerged in 1980-1981 with the Sinclair microcomputers and advent of 'home computing'. With a ZX81 there was going to be a need to navigate this space between the what is human and what is machine. Two categories that remain key concerns today.

The DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - published by the American Psychiatric Association [APA] ) is on the chapter's first page, plus the patient, researchers, psychiatrists and the conditions learned during their medical education, contrasted with individual psychiatrist's clinical encounters with patients. 

Very quickly (the next page p.86) Murphy identifies the 'circumstantial factors' that cause mental illness. This is very positive as acknowledging the determinants across health is key, however framed, e.g. social determinants, economic, educational we must take into account all of them. Otherwise our assessment must be considered as incomplete, or at least lacking?

The utility of Prof. Murphy's short book is in how prior to the case studies we see the problem of definitions. And how what is determined is often a matter of convenience. This is a non-trivial matter - especially in health, economics, sciences, politics, future and peace studies: you get the idea...

Of immediate relevance in the USA is the need for categories for insurance purposes. It is an industry. Yes, indeed: 'The truth is that psychiatric patients vary in every possible way', p.86. Computers of course are well-equipped to help us in the creation, revision and publication - access to categories; with classification, taxonomy, nomenclature ... also in the mix. I was reminded of WHO's history of classification (see below) which I point students and colleagues to.

The way DSM is applied is explained and the politics duly noted (especially in Chap. 7). Resort to 'miscellaneous' is described as a sign that 'the categories are not necessarily picking out 'natural kinds'. I remember in the 90s, our PICK database on a community mental health project had Murphy's 'X' not otherwise specified. I don't think I read the word 'caseness', but there is a lot 'inside'!? References are ongoing. I wondered if there could be more recent examples, but perhaps this is in turn symptomatic of categorisation tending to be the rear car? Fuzziness is discussed. Plus, the observation that 'a few psychiatric categories may be true natural kinds, like gold or rainbow trout.' p.89. 

'Change' is a mantra for all disciplines in the NHS and global healthcare. So pragmatic to see how revision and change in the DSM can be used by - dare I mention - anti-psychiatry advocates and clinicians as to what change represents to these respective interest groups? At a time when research is experiencing funding changes, Murphy contrasts how DSM was developed for the use of clinicians to identify people with similar profiles, but they were not developed to identify (research - Nat. Inst. for Mental Health) underlying causes. Raising the determinants once again, p.91.

It is obvious but as personnel and Brits may look at private medicine with coding purposed for insurance purposes; there is within the NHS (public-funded healthcare) and psychiatry (a single domain too) within and the need by patients for diagnosis, and the welfare system. Here in the UK the rise of mental health in young adults, autism and waiting lists for assessment for ADHD are a moot point.  

Through Hodges' model we some possibly fascinating bridges, that are much less-travelled these days? In many cultures, even if we do not need permission to be sick, it needs to be recognised socially - and so politically. Society needs to deal with individuals who are ill, infirm, disabled. It's interesting then to reflect on this issue and phenomena through the lens of anthropology and medical sociology. Murphy warns to of the dangers 'of thinking of something as being the category'. In medicine a new approach is needed, as Murphy also notes. A nice bridge to chapter 7 Categories and Power.
'The case studies discussed in the previous chapters remind us that categories can be political and social tools. An old department chair of mine had the saying, "She who sets the agenda controls the meeting." We might coin a new one, "Those who make the categories control the outcomes." If your psychodiagnostic categories are made by working therapists and physicians, they might facilitate treatment- -and also benefit those practitioners. If they are made by researchers, they might not be very useful for treatment at all. And if they are made by insurance companies, all bets are off.' p.95.
Trying to take my attempts to find theoretical underpinning (category 'trying to clever') I've a diagram scribbled here. Nearby, p.100, I picked up on 'the cost of losing information or distorting reality to some degree.' Murphy picks up on the ICD Int. Classification of Diseases here. Twitter is still twitter here - thumbs up for that! There is a useful example of the impact of categories in age, pregnancy and medical attention provided.

From Chapter 8, I picked out: Naming Nature: The Clash Between Instinct and Science, by Carol Kaesuk Yoon. W. W. Norton: 2009. 352 pp. £19.99/$27.95 9780393061970 | ISBN: 978-0-3930-6197-0; and checking, I remember the book's cover. Murphy's book overall highlights the convenience of our categories, the ongoing challenges and everyday conundrums they present though the remaining chapters on Species (8); Peanut Butter, Potato Chips, Almond Milk... (9); Racial Categories (10). These all contribute, still building a coherent picture, chapter 10 vital among them with a url provided (which may have changed):

https://anthropology-tutorials-nggs7.kinsta.page/adapt/adapt_4.htm


The one-drop rule (David, 1991) on p.126, is deeply troubling. Especially so given some examples of human reasoning even today. Medicine, by way of blood tests, features again. I smiled wryly reading how people from different countries have different rates of disease, e.g. 'heart disease in Scotland'. Instantly, and crackling - a deep-fried Mars bar popped into my mind. 

The things people do. You - really could read this book! 

Murphy, Gregory L. Categories we live by: how we classify everyone and everything. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2024.

Many thanks again to MIT Press for the review copy and Prof Murphy for a great read.

Previously: DSM : fuzzy : categories

Tuesday, March 03, 2026

Thoughts ii re. 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop

For me, applying Hodges' model I tend to place philosophy and psychiatry (mind, thought, belief, truth, intention ...) within the humanistic part of the model. So, Ewa Grzeszczak and - Philosophy of psychiatry and the methodology of social ontology - stood out. This is helpful as Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC) are a useful structure, spanning bio-mathematics. As suggested previously with 'equality', we can place the philosophical non-trivial question of kinds at the centre of Hodges' model and proceed (if possible?) from there.

The requirement for a holistic, integrative and pluralistic framework is there in literature. A statement supported by Alessandra Civani's talk: 'What kind of concept is ‘incongruence’? I located a paper:

Enactive psychiatry - A pragmatic and pluralistic approach to mental health and disease

- (and now have a copy c/o and thanks to Alessandra) and am grateful to being pointed to de Haan:

An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry

 I will (must) return to these papers. Earlier on Hodges' model, I'd opined (as on 'X') how the -

  • medical
  • biomedical
  • bio-psycho-social models - are insufficient in the 21st century.

There was a thematic feel to the presentations with Anna Golova - Self-illness ambiguity without a self-illness distinction - following nicely. The styling on the slides was an added bonus. I located an informative (co-authored) paper by Golova:

‘Is it me or my illness?’: self-illness ambiguity as a useful conceptual lens for psychiatry'

Part of the power of Hodges' model derives not so much from its duality; as its dual axes. The two axes can encompass and handle the relatedness between/within reductionism, holist perspectives, the self and otherness, illness and health (well-being).

An hours break brought us to an event which was very well attended, clearly open to the public:

6-7pm Prof Miriam Solomon – Royal Institute of Philosophy talk ‘Stigma as an actant in the history of psychiatry’

In setting out the talk's structure I liked Prof. Solomon's reference to the common, implicit "grime" theory of the dynamic of stigma, and "punching down" as a strategy for managing stigma. 'Grime' made me think of sense of smell, the grime in my father's work van, a diesel. Now so many memories are evoked with the merest whiff. More positively, the patina of physical and mental life also came to mind. You would - might think stigma has been dealt with by now, but of course we are socio-politically far from it.

There is a related podcast from 2025, which also covers Prof. Solomon's early studies. A previous paper was also noted in the slides:

Solomon, M. (2025). The Elusiveness of Hermeneutic Injustice in Psychiatric Categorizations. Social Epistemology, 39(2), 166–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2024.2400068
 
Discussion of the DSM inevitably followed (and in the above podcast). In questions the 'reality' of severe mental illness, and suggestion of the acute challenge of managing the negative symptoms of psychoses.
 
Prof. Solomon's conclusion was well worth waiting for, including:
Stigma as an "actant" (cf. Bruno Latour's concept of an agent: causal role without intention)... DSM - ICD...
 
If stigma disappeared tomorrow, the DSM would not have the same categories. 
 
Stigma (more specifically, its management) is shaping the conceptual space, with both scientific and moral consequences.

[Added 4th March...] On Friday - Sam Fellowes, took on, or has taken on - the non-trivial issue of - Modelling psychiatric diagnoses when self-diagnosing - how does this work? Complexity was acknowledged on the first slide, with self-diagnosis, and modelling, set against the Duhem-Quine thesis. 

This technical aspect is welcome and no doubt essential given the socio-technical nature of diagnosis, touching as it does the public (society), primary care, psychiatry, service user groups, policymakers, informatics, and HM Treasury, amongst several 'stakeholders'. With the impact of the internet and social media, much (if not all?) of the vocabulary of mental health professionals has been co-opted and re-framed(?) by patient / service-user groups? It does not, for example, appear that the agency behind the DSM will be able to claim it back. Autism and ADHD were also discussed and debated. I located a previous chapter by Sam (pay-wall):

Fellowes S. Self-Diagnosis in Psychiatry and the Distribution of Social Resources. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 2023;94:55-76. doi:10.1017/S1358246123000218
 
This really is a thicket of thorns, it spreads as and wherever you go.
 
The welfare bill is such that there should have been government Ministers in attendance. I have responded on behalf of clients to PIP assessments. Agencies have invited me to interview for 'Disability Assessor' roles. Not only is this a complex web, but several logics obtain: a perverse temporal logic operates, binary logic and a fixed mindset can develop so that some (vulnerable!?) individuals can get stuck. Perhaps, a social imperative steps in and disrupts, life chances: their being a NEET ('a young person who is no longer in the education system and who is not working or being trained for work'. Ecosia) is better for someone else? 
 
To unpick, make sense of this, you need a foundational universal model.
 
There is a (co-authored) paper from Giulia Russo, who presented - Epistemic and political role of experience: https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTPO-112 from which:
'As it is widely known, epistemic injustice was introduced by Fricker (2007) to unveil power relations that have negative consequences on people as epistemic agents. She distinguished in particular two different kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. The first kind occurs when a person (usually in a disadvantaged and oppressed role within the epistemic relation) is damaged as a knower because, as the name suggests, their testimony is overlooked, dismissed or invalidated. The second kind of epistemic injustice occurs when a person is deprived of the epistemic resources to even explain or articulate their experience of distress, or of systemic oppression. In connection to this, the concepts of neurodivergence and neurodiversity come from the political and social arena, and are born explicitly to contrast dominant pathologizing narratives in psychiatry.'
In seeking some 'test' cases to try to model relationally, Hodges' model suggests at least four - without letting the care / knowledge domains wag-the-dog. Giulia's talk was very helpful, ranging across forms of epistemic injustice (addressed by others too), identity, neurodivergence, lived experience, self-, counter- and collective narratives with references. A great resource.
 
Frank Denning, reminded me of an important phenomena, in Using Stebbing’s Directional Analysis to Evaluate ‘Mentalizing’. Talking therapies, or more properly referral to talking therapies often presents several criteria that would-be subjects must 'pass'. An ability to mentalize, can represent one. This is understanable, for effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy ... it is to be found in the manual. But, in terms of power relations, gate keeping in various forms is a literal (virtual) key to service access. Hodges' model is no different (sigh!). At what age can people start to use Hodges' model? What mentalization is involved to cognitively engage in use of Hodges' model? 
 
I struggled to obtain a copy of Stebbing's original work from 1930, but see how closely tied the work is to physics. An Internet Archive copy is poor quality. The search will continue, as I suspect there are links to Bill Ross's text on Deleuzian cosmology. It is marvellous that work from 1930 resonates today. There is: 

Janssen-Lauret, F. (Accepted/In press). Directional Analysis in Susan Stebbing’s Philosophy of Physics. In S. Chapman (Ed.), Susan Stebbing on Logic and Analysis Springer Nature. 
https://pure.manchester.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/338653274/Directional_Analysis_in_Susan_Stebbing_s_Philosophy_of_Physics_Final_.pdf

Gloria Ayob - Flourishing as mental health - was encouraging. 'TASK 1:EQUATION' a slide was titled, including emotional disorder is meta-evaluative; there are negative and positive poles, plus isomorphism between unpleasantness-pleasantness and disorder-health. I think my stomach was protesting I should have paid more attention. There is a blog post by Gloria: https://blog.oup.com/2024/12/the-concept-of-emotional-disorder/

After lunch Richard Hassall - Hermeneutical Injustice and Damaged Intellectual Self-Trust in Psychiatric Service Users, a reminder of the time and effort that needs to be put into public and patient involvement and engagement in mental health service (when this is desired). References included J.L. Austin and J.S. Bruner. A paper:

Hassall R. Sense-making and hermeneutical injustice following a psychiatric diagnosis. J Eval Clin Pract. 2024 Aug;30(5):848-854. doi: 10.1111/jep.13971. Epub 2024 Feb 20. PMID: 38375925.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jep.13971 

Scoping reviews are more common it seems: Lara Calabrese - Exploring epistemic injustice in dementia care: a scoping review and a qualitative study, plus paper [with QR code on the slide]:

Calabrese L, Brigiano M, Quartarone M, Chirico I, Trolese S, Lambiase F, Forte L, Annini A, Bortolotti L, Chattat R. I'm still here and my opinion matters: a scoping review on the experience of epistemic injustice among people living with dementia. Curr Psychol. 2025 Dec 17;45(1):s12144-025-08519-y. doi: 10.1007/s12144-025-08519-y. PMID: 41445984; PMCID: PMC7618523.
 
The paper's title here brought to mind the radio programme "Does He Take Sugar?" Questions followed regards the studies methods. Since leaving I wondered if there has been an evaluation of Dementia Friendly Communities? Are there dots to usefully joined there?
 
The final talk was delivered (with gusto - pepped me up anyway) by Jacob Barlow - Epistemic borders: experts, communities, communication. Jacob's interest in pragmatism was apparent. I look forward to reading future work, and note Liverpool 2025: ‘Problems with Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Psychiatry’.

All in all, a stimulating and enjoyable event.

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

vi Book: 'Complexity in Health Care - A Paradigm Shift for Clinical Practice'

The rest of the book is practice-based which is a strength. Chapter 18 has three clinical illustrations, were reflection and self-reflection is brought to fore. Especially so, as it pointed out that the 'clinical situation/encounter' introduces its own 'vagaries', or noise which can impact the 'quality of the bond between clinician and patient'. Rapport is the key. 

I was still missing 'complexity' and its dynamics, but I'm sure of the following:

If this was discussed - could be represented then the book would be theory-laden and I and other would-be readers would not be able to understand.

I still think Hodges' model can help, and in chapter 19 picked out 'manifold' (p.113), as if doing so, manifests something more esoteric. There is something here, the author noting the need to shift from individual to group perspectives. So, yes I think we can do more than embrace 'complexity' (p.114).

On page 116 there is discussion of the sometimes sudden path to recovery, 'probably common but often not comprehended'. Please pardon the naivety, but I scribbled 'hidden in complexity, what would (say) the three(?) equations be?'. For a book published in 2023 'artificial intelligence' is not indexed. This might be one area that AI could assist, given the progress in formal mathematics (but see below p.183!)? Algorithm is mentioned throughout the book. Further reading here, informed me that engaging with a reading group on 'Philosophical Counselling' is worthwhile. It is!

Part IX had me wondering if the debate about typical and complex cases, there is a slight of perspective going on? You can end up with paradoxes in terms of an individual's needs, criteria, risk, 'need for admission'. Which I must think about! Chapter 20 has three further reading texts on abductive reasoning. There's an appeal(?) on page 129 for an appropriate treatment model, well that is my take. Collaborative care and stepped care models are suggested. But with acknowledgement that:

'In truth, all models currently available may involve a defect in continuity within or between systems'. p.129.

I beg to differ. A role of Hodges' model is to help frame aspects of care through time, to facilitate and assure continuity.

Part X tackles the required precision in assessment, hence recourse to mathematics and statistics. The next two chapters may be useful for early career researchers and yet looking over our shoulders what is ai offering here? In Case 1 I was impressed by the suggestion of a health record that is over 70 years old. Not impossible of course, but I thought of the Lloyd George envelopes, their hospital equivalents, other paper sources and inevitable scanning this would entail here in the UK? Of interest to research is the creation and validation of complexity profiling inventories (tools) not just that, but their self-assessment form of delivery. And, yes in summary chapter 24:

'We are still left with the challenge of rating the patients' severely compromised health situations where "health" includes social, emotional, and financial well-being.' p.143.

'How do you factor this interpersonal situation into your complexity equation?' p.144.

Yes, how indeed? 

The realities of research of dealt with - funding for the development of tools a problem universally. The references here concern biopsychosocial complexity. Chapter 25 describes abstraction, and hiding detail, which is of great interest here. DSM-5 criteria for major depressive disorder are listed (DSM-6 may be released in 2029?). 

In chapter 25 the authors are once stymied by 'how to include (integrate? PJ) four dimensions, three time periods,and assorted assessment items in a single assessment.' 

As noted the four domains are here again (p.151): medical, psychological, social and care delivery and on page 153, introducing chapter 26, limitations of complexity assessment tools. Parity as in 'parity of esteem' is not indexed and I don't recall having read this, but this is well represented in later deliberations on variables #2. You will find psychosis, but not in depth or severity.

 In 'Creation of a New Model for Clinical Practice' (Chapter 31) identity is stressed, as a prompt to encompass those variables that contribute to preserving the person - what is humanistic. Allied with manifold, identity is a 'coi' for me, concept of interest - for this same reason. On page 172: the authors observe they 'are left with the question of whether there are acceptably accurate clinical models that are simpler and more straightforward than ours? We believe the answer is no!'. I believe there is a way, and a model to help 'keep the life in clinical work' - not take it out. There is a sense that Chapter 32 seeks what I was looking for above: as they explore random variable and 'sample spaces' descriptively - over a page.

Ah! 'Artificial intelligence' is found in text p.183. I'm surprised an editor, proofreader aloud the following sentence to go unchallenged?

'But, as will be discussed, these computer techniques have their limitations based on their lack of flexibility.' 

I was genuinely surprised to read this. Plus, again on ai on page 185: 'Making inferences is not reliably their domain.' I think I would look more at the human-ai interface. And the status of ai within psychiatry as opposed to medicine, but that is also another (parity - divide) debate. Things really are complex now on so many fronts: ethics especially.

Perhaps I am looking for the cookbook formula as introduced for chapter 35 clinical judgement. The further reading is combined with critical thinking. More detail on the empirical-collaborative method is welcome. When I read 'illustrated' I take this literally. Again I can disagree twice on page 220. I know Hodges' model is not validated, but it can - with practice(?) - do this light (simple) or heavy (complex) lifting. 

The warning about dogma needs to be repeated regularly. It is rather like the need for nurses to revisit their profession, role and work as relates to the law. Is Hodges' model an over-valued idea? Am I guilty of thinking I'm an expert? A problem with that view is that any assumed expertise is stretched across the whole model. So if anything there is a shallowness, but this means that I see my particular scope of practice, as other colleagues / professions see theirs. Here in the UK of late, this seems to have become rather blurred. 

In closing with this and achieving a "real-life" understanding of a case, with synthesis - path analysis diagram, the author's underline the value of their book which I have enjoyed and informed my preparation for WCCS26 (more to follow there). The authors can perhaps be reassured that all practitioners have a means to achieve their paradigm shift as described here - with added value and values.

There is a missed word: "of the situation ['with'?] him" on page 114. And revision needed re. text beginning with 'his boyish Paul McCartney "mop-top" ... on page 214. Spelling error on 216 'retu(r)ning'. 

Thanks again to Daniela and colleagues at SpringerNature for the review copy.

Steven A. Frankel, Steven D. Thurber, James A. Bourgeois (2023) Complexity in Health Care: A Paradigm Shift for Clinical Practice. Cham. Switzerland: Springer. ISBN: 978303114948.

Friday, November 16, 2012

Conceptual Reflections on Schizophrenia - Hodges' model

A decade ago I was studying the Psychosocial Interventions for Psychosis (COPE) pathway part-time at Manchester University. The student body was interprofessinal made up of nurses, psychologists, occupational therapists, nurses and if memory serves me right people from the voluntary (third) sector. What I learned then left me wondering where I had been all those years since qualifying (lost in IT....).

There are many universities now delivering this curriculum, presenting the very latest research. The lecturers are frequently the researchers themselves, working in ongoing multicenter trials studying  various aspects of the treatment and care management of psychosis.

This is why it is very alarming to hear of the lack of progress not just within in-patient care as per the findings of the Schizophrenia Commission, but the delivery of care for these individuals and their families across the health and social care system. Of course, as a former student and holder of a PG(Dip.) I am not at present practising these skills formally.

In the h2cm table that follows I have highlighted some of the main concepts across the care domains of Hodges' model:

INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES
SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL

beliefs, perception, attention, anxiety, stress, vulnerability, pleasure, feedback, motivation, mood, therapies, therapeutic relationship, communication, assets, cognitive triad, perception, delusions, hallucinations, positive and negative symptoms, person-centered care, existing coping strategies, mental health assessment, literacies (3Rs, emotional, health), salience, attention, attribution, meaning, creativityphysical health, weight, fitness, side effects, medication, atypical antipsychotics, evidence,
genetics, research, diagnosis, (cognitive) information processing, dual diagnosis, risk, models of care, recovery, hierarchy of clinical evidence, care processes - assessment, care planning, access to interventions, audio recording of sessions, protocols, DSM IV
clinical supervision, social attitudes - family, friends, community, stigma, myth, media, carers, familes, social relationships, network, self help groups, survivors,
www.hearing-voices.org/
activities, daily routine, 'value' of a diagnosis - pros & cons (discuss), community centers, clinical supervision, positive risk management, employment, social history of mental health, social psychiatry, stories,education - schools & community,
'community care', housing
mental health history, institutional vs. community care, mental health law, autonomy, consent, capacity, best interests, equity
mental health services, early intervention, access, POLICY, anti-psychiatry, equity, governance, data gathering, statistics, reporting, outcomes, services,
secure provision, early intervention, crisis intervention, DSM V, commissioning,
funding for mental health, education and training, sickness - welfare benefits - 'incapacity' review 'return to work'

The relative position of concepts above does not indicate priority.

Wednesday, December 24, 2025

Person-centredness, Holistic approach, Prevention c/o Hippocrates

“It is more important to know what sort of person 
has a disease than to know 
what sort of disease a person has.” 
Hippocrates

 
Individual
|
      INTERPERSONAL    :     SCIENCES               
HUMANISTIC  --------------------------------------  MECHANISTIC      
 SOCIOLOGY  :    POLITICAL 
|
Group
To say that Hippocrates was ahead of his time is a gross understatement. Hippocrates recognised the importance of person-centredness and prevention, and contributed to the emergence of several medical specialties. (Kostakopoulos, et al., 2024). 


'Holistic Approach

One of the most significant innovations of the founding father of clinical medicine was the holistic approach for the diagnosis and treatment of disease. This approach is based on the assumption that the human body is a sum of many parts that function in harmony and that if one part is ill, the balance will be affected and the whole person will suffer. Hippocrates considered that patients consisted of body, mind, and spirit and this is also the modern physicians' approach when treating a disease [2].'
 

Health and social care are still playing catch-up. The vitriolic 'debate' on X over psychiatry - anti-psychiatry and DSM-X. The total inability now to shift to preventive healthcare due to the perverse, entrenched economic incentives, which facilitate increasing inequity, inequality.

Whichever Government does switch to preventive medicine, perhaps other governments had better take note? 

I think Hippocrates would have approved - wholeheartedly - of Hodges' model. 

 

'Prevention of Disease

Another important aspect of Hippocrates' works that is widely applied in 21st-century medicine is the prevention of disease. The phrase “Κάλλιον το προλαμβάνειν του θεραπεύειν,” which means that it is better to prevent than to treat a disease, was the cornerstone of his teachings and is based on the observation that healthy Mediterranean diet and daily moderate physical activity can prevent disease. The ancient Greeks believed that all maladies started from the gut and that walking was the best available medicine [2].'



Kostakopoulos NA, Bellos TC, Katsimperis S, Tzelves L. Hippocrates of Kos (460-377 BC): The Founder and Pioneer of Clinical Medicine. Cureus. 2024 Oct 1;16(10):e70602. doi: 10.7759/cureus.70602. PMID: 39483540; PMCID: PMC11526839.

Gabbard, G. The Person with the Diagnosis. Psychiatric News. 49;6. 19 March 2014. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2014.3b19.

Brigić, A., Hasanović, M., Pajević, I., Aljukić, N., Hamidović, J., & Jakovljević, M. (2021). Principles of Hippocratic Medicine from the Perspective of Modern Medicine. Psychiatria Danubina, 33(Suppl 4), 1210–1217. 

See also: 'medicine' : 'person' : 'diagnosis' : 'prevention'

Wednesday, August 05, 2020

Book: "Rethinking Causality, Complexity and Evidence for the Unique Patient"

Rethinking Causality, Complexity and Evidence for the Unique Patient
Rethinking Causality, Complexity and Evidence for the Unique Patient


Questions arising:
Where would you place whole person care in the model below?
Similarly, what about evidence, complexity,
person-centred care, the unique patient?


individual
|
INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES
humanistic ----------------------------------------------- mechanistic
SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL
|
group - population
mind (soul - personhood)
subjective (inc. PAIN)
quality
subject

Psychotherapy & others
psycho-
philosophy
Diagnosis: classification DSM..
dispositions, cognition, bias, beliefs
mental health
PURPOSE(S)


2. -PSYCHO-
Intrapersonal
Interpersonal (skills)

Reflection - Reflexive

(individual) psychology
(em-)body (machine)
objective (inc. PAIN)
quantity
object

Physiotherapy & others
-somatic
scientific method
Bayesian formula, analgesia
biomedical model, treatment
Diagnosis: classification ICD SNOMED..
1. Yes. The BIO-
Thresholds, intensity, prediction
cause, causality, explanation, reductionism
dispositional causality,
relation - flow
PROCESS(ES)
TIME
events, clinical 'content',
[Sciences(Physics,Chemistry,Biology..)]
(group) psychology

relationships
, support

3. SOCIAL model


sociology (of PAIN, disease)
Medical Sociology

phenomenological - lived experience

PRACTICE


CLINICAL ENCOUNTER
political - power - autonomy

Where is the individual
|
within the collective?



4. ... is incomplete (p.83)

POLICY

CLINICAL ENCOUNTER

See also:


Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Book: 'Logic on the Track of Social Change'

When I walked into Lancaster Univ. library in February, I had no idea I was being followed.

From the maths shelves, the lights switching on as you progress, I decided to walk across to the more familiar realm of sociology. Looking for something, it was nice to see the parity in lighting, even as my struggle for mathematical enlightenment continues.

Logic on the Track of Social Change    

I do use the e-library, and other e-resources, but sometimes real shelves and varying levels of mustiness (remember the 'new acquisitions' - fewer these days?) invite a bit of serendipity. Suddenly, over my shoulders, the stranger,  pointed (with four arms of course). Was it my shadow? Or, was it my unconscious that 'read': LOGIC and TRACK and SOCIAL CHANGE, on the spine of -

David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown & Peter K. Schotch (eds.), Logic on the Track of Social Change, Oxford University Press. 1995?

In the early decades of health informatics, there was much talk - and still is(?) - of  'languages for health', even languages for nursing. Coding and classification systems were constantly developing, as posted here, but while physical diagnoses were the driver, the psychosocial dimensions of person - patienthood proved more nebulous. DSM is still subject much debate.

 Chapter 8 in Braybrook et al. is brilliant: A Rules-Analysis, Following Foucault, of the Birth of Clinical Medicine.

I've been in situations when surgery is suggested for an older person, and family, friends wonder is this really necessary? This chapter literally brings the history home, and not only that, but the emergence of the hospital system, versus care at home, in the community. The social determinants of health have been ever-present. This is essential reading for students, with the history of ICD, and the history of medicine. There are insights too into public attitudes and expectations to health services and provision here in the UK and in France.

For me, and Hodges' model, the significance of Braybrook, Brown, Schotch and Byrne is that it precedes:

Sallach, D.L. Categorical Social Science: Theory, Methodology and Design. September 2012
Conference: Fourth World Congress on Social Simulation. Taipei, Taiwan.
https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/Sallach2012CategoricalSoSci4.WCSS-SS.pdf

And so, I do need my own secondhand copy of  Logic on the Track of Social Change. More to follow (indeed)! ... and help still welcome and needed.
 

Tuesday, March 11, 2025

Joint-carving - 'The First Cut is the Deepest' c/o Traldi

Last Friday I joined in another online session of the Argumentation network c/o Andrew Aberdein and Kat Stevens. 

The subject was “The Epistemology and Politics of Redefinition” by Oliver Traldi.

As ever, it was interesting, technical, relevant and a prompt to concepts new, briefly encountered previously. I can't remember if in the talk, or Q&A, but mention was made of 'joint-carving' but I checked some sources:
'Because properties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. Any two things share infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many others. That is so whether the two things are perfect duplicates or utterly dissimilar. Thus properties do nothing to capture facts of resemblance. That is work more suited to the sparse universals. Likewise, properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the crowd. Properties carve reality at the joints -- and everywhere else as well. If it's distinctions we want, too much structure is no better than none.' p.346.
Lewis, D. 1983. New Work for a Theory of Universals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. doi:10.1080/00048408312341131

'Though the facts or truths that the realist judges mind-independent are most commonly put in terms of a kind’s ‘naturalness’ (or lack thereof), they may be formulated in alternative locutions, such as the ‘reality,’ ‘non-reality,’ or ‘artificiality’ of a kind or kinds. For example, that human races are not real, or that protons form a natural kind, both express such facts. Equivalently, Plato’s famous carving metaphor may be used to do so, as when it is asserted that the classifications of the DSM-5 do not carve nature at the joints. For the sake of expository simplicity I will exclusively use the language of ‘naturalness’ here, but translations into alternative terminology are straightforward.'
Franklin-Hall, L. 2015. Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):925-948.


Further, Sass writes:
'The goal is to have a consistent and informative test for what counts
as a realist versus an anti-realist view about natural kinds. Bird’s(2018) taxonomy,
building on Hawley and Bird(2011), focuses on the questions of whether natural
kinds exist, and if so, what sort of entity kinds are. Franklin-Hall’s (2015) taxonomy
focuses instead on whether kinds are individuated by a mind-independent principle,
or whether kinds “carve at the joints”.1 This paper focuses mainly on the issues raised
by Bird’s (2018) taxonomy.' p.11862.
Sass, R. 2021. An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds. Synthese, 198(12), 11861–11880. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48692794 [ homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theories of kinds ].

In the past, I've written about the (nursing, IT, psychological...) models muddle. At the risk of adding to my muddle, Traldi's presentation is a timely prompt. Timely, because trying to looking at Hodges' model as a mathematical object, it needs to be stripped down to its bare components (and purposes?). Is redefinition the order of the day? I will leave defining the components to one-side at present (in drafted notes). But even from Hodges' model as a template, with its (two) axes and (four) domains we can (must) consider:

1. The two axes taken as a whole - do they intersect, or not?*

Relationally, the axis between:

INTERPERSONAL | SCIENCES
SOCIOLOGY | POLITICAL
INTERPERSONAL - SOCIOLOGY
SCIENCES - POLITICAL

2. Each axis (treated independently) to the centre of Hodges' model. (See 1.)

The conjoining of axes (do they?):

The INDIVIDUAL - HUMANISTIC and INDIVIDUAL - MECHANISTIC.

The HUMANISTIC - GROUP and GROUP - MECHANISTIC.
                                
Hodges' model
I won't continue now, but I have wondered if one axis is primary? Which one comes first? Faced with a blank piece of paper, or flipchart ... which axis gets drawn first?

In guided discovery workshops, teaching sessions I have been directed by the context and duty of care. Given that this is clinical then the I-G is where I start, or lead the discussion.

Perhaps, (as per the previous post) there is a safety dividend in having to consider this question more formally (forcibly)?


I remember Rod Stewart's rendition of  'The First Cut is the Deepest' - even as governments work to make this cut as shallow as possible.

The INDIVIDUAL - GROUP cut: has it every time.

Previously: 'argumentation'

Sunday, March 15, 2026

ii 'GlobalMinds' - NHS study severe mental health problems

GlobalMinds has clearly stated goals and objectives. Three challenges that are highlighted:

  1. Diagnosis can take years
  2. Treatments target symptoms, not underlying causes
  3. Half of the prescribed drugs cause severe side effects

These are, to put it mildly, highly contested issues. Diagnosis in mental health/illness is problematic in several respects, for example:

INDIVIDUAL
|
    INTERPERSONAL    :     SCIENCES               
HUMANISTIC --------------------------------------  MECHANISTIC      
SOCIOLOGY  :   POLITICAL 
|
GROUP
a) Lack of Theoretical, Practical and Philosophical(?) agreement between: 
  • Psychology
  • Psychiatry
b) Individuals are self diagnosing
c) Access to mental health services can be highly structure - single-point entry
d) The evidence-base for treatment of mental illness is growing,but remains contested.
e) Perhaps there is a phenomena of people getting stuck, with not just a label, but a mindset?

a) Loss of trust in classification/coding schemes:
  • DSM
b) Proposed alternatives in -
c) Data defined scientifically:
  • existing diagnosis
  • biomarker

a) Increased awareness of mental illness, ADHD..
b) Behavioural explanations for mental illness
c) The determinants of mental illness (unlike, health?) are poorly researched (hence understood)
d) The vocabulary of mental illness (psychiatry) is more widely disseminated, hence used; not necessarily with full contextual understanding
e) Stigma associated with mental illness is nevertheless ongoing.


a) Reduced economic productivity
b) The socio-economic phenomena of NEETs
c) Increased demand on welfare benefits
d) The role of primary care - GPs
     - fit / sick notes
     - 'functional assessors' (Who is best placed?)
e) Loss of mental health beds, community compensations incomplete.


This will be a space to watch: and related (global) initiatives? 

Viewed from Hodges' health career - care domains - model, it appears an individual's life chances and expectations (family, and educational experience?) can result in their life chances being frozen?

Friday, July 29, 2022

The Cass Review Interim Report ... reflections ...

 ... that may stand for themselves?

[ with my emphasis ]


Independent review of gender identity services for children and young people: 

Interim report

February 2022

Introduction from the Chair

"... the aim of the Review is to ensure that children and young people who are experiencing gender incongruence or gender-related distress receive a high standard of NHS care that meets their needs and is safe, holistic and effective." p.11.

 

"As with autism, the framework for assessment needs to become formalised so there are clearer criteria for diagnosis and treatment pathways which are shared more widely. These should incorporate not just whether the child or young person meets DSM-5 criteria for gender dysphoria, but how a broader psychosocial assessment should be conducted and evaluated, and what other factors need to be considered to gain a holistic understanding of the child or young person’s experience. Professional judgement and experience will still be important, but if the frameworks and criteria for assessment and diagnosis were more consistent and reproducible, there would be a greater likelihood that two different people seeing the same child or young person would come to the same conclusion." p.60.

"Assessment and management: All children and young people who are referred to specialist services should have a competent local multi-disciplinary assessment and should remain under active holistic local management until they are seen at a specialist centre." p.92.

[ and from: https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/spec-services/npc-crg/gender-dysphoria-clinical-programme/implementing-advice-from-the-cass-review/ ]

"Dr Cass has now sent further advice on the core components of this model. You can read the advice in full here.

In summary, she has said:

  ...

  • ‘The services should have an appropriate multi-professional workforce to enable them to provide an integrated model of care that manages the holistic needs of this population’.
  • ‘Staff should maintain a broad clinical perspective to embed the care of children and young people with gender uncertainty within a broader child and adolescent health context’."

 

Wednesday, March 30, 2022

Re-Inventing Schizophrenia: Updating the Construct

INDIVIDUAL
|
 INTERPERSONAL    :     SCIENCES               
HUMANISTIC --------------------------------------  MECHANISTIC      
SOCIOLOGY  :   POLITICAL 
|


Re-Inventing Schizophrenia: Updating the Construct. Edited by Rajiv Tandon, Matcheri Keshavan, Henry Nasrallah. Schizophrenia Research. Volume 242, Pages 1-150 (April 2022).

My source:
https://twitter.com/JeroticStefan/status/1508898715473530888?s=20&t=X61DSrPzEyLvX-FhzY5r-A

Need for bio-psycho-socio-POLITICAL perspectives - spiritual too.

Previously on W2tQ: DSM

 

Wednesday, June 03, 2020

Diagnosis vs Formulation in Mental Health

"Should psychological formulation replace diagnosis?"

When Brian Hodges created the model the original purposes (c. 1983-84) were to facilitate:
  1. Reflection and reflective practice;
  2. Integrated - person-centred care;
  3. Holistic care (mental, physical, social, political and spiritual) and;
  4. Bridge the Theory - Practice gap.
After learning and applying the model in 1987-88 I quickly recognised the multi-fold purposes and functions to which Hodges' model can be applied. One of these is clinical assessment which are encapsulated in 1-4 above. Importantly this includes assessment across all fields of health and social care; and more specifically case formulation as applied within various psychological therapies and interventions.

Noting a tweet (see below) I knew straight away that here is a blog post, even before being pointed to an associated blog post,

In 1998-9 I started a course on the use of psychosocial intervention and cognitive behaviour therapy in psychoses. From the outset as a student mental health nurse, you are constantly made aware of the politics in psychiatry and mental health nursing:

Clare, A.W. (1976) Psychiatry in Dissent: Controversial Issues in Thought and Practice. London: Tavistock

Even on twitter (and I don't wish to denote surprise) there is often marked debate, critique, even sniping between psychology, psychiatrists and users of mental health services, patients, or survivors whichever nomenclature you prefer.

I have always tried to draw student's attention to coding and classification. Key to this is purpose: clinical diagnosis, epidemiology, research, demographics, national and international reporting and statistics (plus of course - pandemic management). Being a health care professional demands an awareness of diagnosis, the tools available, how they change and their limitations. Even if it is 'not your job' to 'diagnose', that understanding is important to your effectiveness and ability to empathise with patients, carers and families.

Implicit in Hodges' Health Career - Care Domains - Model is time and potential or otherwise for change in and throughout someone's life.

Students will and should become embroiled in the debate of mental illness as a social construct. Although world events at present heighten the view of things being polarised and now in its starkest form - people too and Yes - #BlackLivesMatter. The continuum model of mental health affords another viewpoint. It suggests the gradual way a person's beliefs can become more bizarre over time. Substance harmful use is not some necessary (essential) precipitating factor, but it can accelerate a negative transformation of a person's view of themselves, others, the world and future.

A diagnosis can be constructive, providing renewed certainty and direction. A diagnosis can also be destructive in terms of how a patient, their loved ones, friends and society receive it. There are nursing diagnoses also; and as such Hodges' model provides a means for a nursing, psychological and clinical case formulation.

In response to reference to the 'medical model', I have tweeted many times how the biopsychosocial model, of which the medical model is a part, is incomplete.

Beyond diagnosis and formulation, there is a need to see the model that really does the work,
for the real elephant in the room to reveal itself.

I am of course referring to the bio-psycho-socio-political model.

Appeal to the medical model, without reference to the political is ingenuous. It is the political after all that permits institutions to award degrees and the granting of licensing and registers to 'practice', prescribe drugs and other treatments. Ready incorporation of the political should be acknowledged by the extent of change through the past 40 years of mental health service provision (and more recent stasis?).

Or, perhaps legislation passed in that time does not yet speak volumes?

The role of community mental health nursing has changed profoundly in this time and the accent (as evinced three days a week Nov-Mar 2020) is upon assisting individuals to manage their substance harmful use, financial affairs, strained therapeutic relationships and emotional dysregulation. Very often it is statutory agencies who 'rely' on diagnoses. A psychological formulation would probably have little 'leverage' as part of a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) assessment or appeal. It is here that a medical diagnosis - has currency. Consultant Psychiatrists have little enough time so the CPN/CMHN acts as the go-between. Reaching across from the intra- interpersonal domain to the political.

The narrative written on the assessment/appeal form will include content that would no doubt contribute to a psychological formulation (and even psychodynamic) were this is relevant purely for the purpose of the assessment. As such it is the dialogues and narratives that are engendered that can increase self and mutual understanding and awareness. This can in turn provide the opportunity to progress more positively a person's situation within which diagnoses and formulations play a part. There is still a great 'gap' between the formulaic and diagnostic outputs and the therapies that are available.


individual
|
INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES
humanistic ----------------------------------------------- mechanistic
SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL
|
group - population
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5)

multiaxial?

Psychological formulation

Psychodynamic formulation

Psychiatric diagnosis

TI:ME

Health career - life chances

Medical diagnosis

multiaxial?

International Classification of Diseases

SNOMED CT

TI:ME

Health career - life chances






[Recruitment agencies seek mental health nurses as 'disability assessors'. I am a realist. I know some people are beyond the pale, but that doesn't mean we should not try. These assessments can be opportunities to engage anew, but of course that is not what is required?]

My prompt:
Samei Huda - Twitter