Birds in paper cages: Cognitive spaces with a little isotropy

In Consciousness Explained, Dennett (1991) provides further support for my belief in the significance of Hodges’ model:

Any of the things you have learned can contribute to any of the things you are currently confronting. That at least is the ideal. This feature is called isotropy by Fodor (1983), the power, as Plato would say, of getting the relevant birds to come, or at least to sing out, whenever they are needed. p.279.

Dennett highlights the fact that we are not isotropic. There are many often comedic instances in which people are slow or fail to fully appraise the significance of new data. This point reinforces the need and role for Hodges’ model providing not just one of Plato’s metaphorical aviaries (with knowledge in the form of the birds), but at least four (five - with spiritual claims to know-ledge).

Next spring I will return to the conceptual spaces paper I started and last saved in September 2008, how time flies! (I do finish stuff eventually - it's not easy this 'part-time' lark). As already posted on W2tQ there is more inspiration if needed. Drawing upon the cognitive science and computing literature the objectives of Peter Gardenfors’ book Conceptual Spaces are made clear from the outset:

'... is to show that a conceptual mode based on geometrical and topological representations deserves at least as much attention in cognitive science as the symbolic and associationistic approaches’. p.2 ....

'This is a book about the geometry of thought. A theory of conceptual spaces will be developed as a particular framework for representing information on the conceptual level.’ p.2.

Further reading:

Jerry A. Fodor (2000) The modularity of mind.

The Frame Problem Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.