In thinking about (with?) Hodges' model, I often feel there is a flip-flop nature to where exactly concepts sit; or more accurately the perspective (care/knowledge domain) from which they are viewed.
Murphy introduces dual-character concepts, 'which are things that have both a prototype (or rule) and an ideal.' p.30. and quotes from:
Knobe J, Prasada S, Newman GE. Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition. 2013 May;127(2):242-57. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005. Epub 2013 Mar 1. PMID: 23454798.
Do dual character concepts operate at varied levels, and in their association (semantic) proximity - relationship to other concepts? All this changing according to context.
Murphy explores the dual category nature of people who claim to be scientists, but are really following a hobbyhorse. That is not lost on me. Others, a baker is following scientific principles while not technically being a scientist p.31. The discussion on art - artists is also informative; turn the page, and that on RINOs - Republican In Name Only - is very timely! There are the problems that science itself can contribute. If you don't know your oxeye daisy from osedaxes you can find out here: fascinating.
'Health' is dual category in a great many respects (and with a chapter to follow). Many have been and will continue to be discussed here:
- person :: service-centredness
- parity of esteem (mental - physical)
- confusion - dementia :: delirium (infection, dehydration)
- mental capacity :: best interests
- community care :: 'in care'
- clinical risk - positive risk taking
- healthcare :: social care
There's a need for careful deliberation too as does this apply to any situation in which there is a smell of dichotomy: good, or bad?
Chapter 3 'Categories in the World and in the Head' helps straight away - declaring a false dichotomy. For me, it's worth revisiting natural categories, natural kinds and essential categories and psychological essentialism. Get these right and surely that's a useful toolkit, or more accurately - first aid kit?
I'm grateful for the placeholder essence (p.46) from:
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179–195). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529863.009
'Psychological essentialism should not be equated with the classical view that concepts are representations of classes of objects that have singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership. ... More generally, we propose that the knowledge representations people have for concepts may contain what might be called an essence placeholder. There are several possibilities for what is in such placeholder. In some cases, but by no means in all, it might be filled with beliefs about what properties are necessary and sufficient for the thing to be what it is. In other cases it might be filled with a more complex, and possibly more inchoate, "theory" of what makes the thing the thing that it is (see Murphy & Medin,1985). It might, additionally, contain the belief (or a representation of the belief) that there are people, experts, who really know what makes the thing the thing that it is, or scholars who are trying to figure out exactly what it is. Just as with theories, what the placeholder contains may change, but the placeholder remains.' pp.184-185.
Hodges' model provides four placeholders. In reading and watching videos on category theory, it appears there is a role for 'placeholders'. I realise the applications - contexts differ, but analogies are powerful too.
Regards, classification as an exercise in convenience, despite the emphasis upon evidence, how often even in clinical matters does it come down to convenience? More to follow on this.
I've never wanted Hodges' model to be a grab-bag for keywords, concepts - categories! So it helps ease that concern, in chapter 4 to see words and categories contrasted. I always wondered about the media's preoccupation with the Inuit and 'snow'. 'Salient' is here as expected in 'Language, Culture and Categories' and with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis p.53. And, of course, nursing and everything else relies on language p.57. Prof. Murphy's mention of children figuring out when it comes to language, and adults just how crazy it - the rules - can seem. While impossible, by definition, I had this thought of toddlers instigating a class action to get things put right. I like the way Murphy reaches across cultures for answers, highlighting the field of ethnobiology p.61. The appeal of this is exaggerated as it stretches across Hodges' model diametrically [sociology - sciences]. I'm still on the look out for models possessed of an 'otherness', that retain legitimacy, validity where and for whom they are employed. (There is much to debate there still.) The objective and subjective dimensions also loom large. I remember a meeting concerned with nursing terminology 1990s, with reflection on the terms used for injection across the UK. That in itself demonstrated wide regional variations that also give pause for thought.
More to follow, with Part 2 'case studies'.
Murphy, Gregory L.
Categories we live by: how we classify everyone and everything. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2024.
Many thanks to
MIT Press for the review copy.
See also:
Categories are destiny' Freud p.6. of 'Categories we live by'
orcid.org/0000-0002-0192-8965
