'Proper domain' c/o Machery 2017

On a visit to London 4-7th, in Foyles on Charing Cross Road amongst many desirable titles I came across:

Machery, Edouard, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (Oxford, 2017; online edn, Oxford Academic, 24 Aug. 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807520.001.0001, accessed 24 June 2025.

Philosophy and knowledge are in constant play: hide and seek. So the title's 'proper bounds' piqued my interest. I found a previous paper by Machery, also cited in the book:

MACHERY, E. (2011). THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE. Metaphilosophy, 42(3), 191–214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439937

The paper is technical (as 'metaphilosophy' suggests) with discussion of thought experiments, parity defence, but there is utility here:

'If we have reason to suspect that a physical skill or a psychological capacity is applied outside its proper domain, our confidence in the success of this application should decrease. If we have no further information about the circumstances in which the skill or capacity is applied or about how these circumstances impact its reliability, then, for all we know, the reliability of the skill or capacity in this particular application might be almost as high as it is in its proper domain, or it might be very low: that is, we have a reason to believe that its reliability is lower than in its proper domain, but we do not know how low it is. In these conditions, we should be reluctant to express much confidence in the success of the application of the skill or capacity'. p.201.

I'm hoping for an e-copy of the book, which avoiding even more screen-time, I won't read through (review - as I call it...) but I will search, read selectively and post again.