Hodges' model: An algebra for care - seeking axioms?

Although Oliver had been brought up by philosophers, he was not theoretically acquainted with the beautiful axiom that self-preservation is the first law of nature.
                                                                                    
- Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist

Coady, C. A. J. (1990). Hobbes and “The Beautiful Axiom.” Philosophy, 65(251), 5–17. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751240

"It is an axiom in therapeutics that the more remedies there are proposed for a disease the less likely is any of them to be effective."

[- William Osler]

Mountin, J. W. (1943). Nursing: A Critical Analysis. The American Journal of Nursing, 43(1), 29–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/3416264

Individual

|

     INTERPERSONAL    :     SCIENCES               

HUMANISTIC  --------------------------------------  MECHANISTIC      

 SOCIOLOGY  :    POLITICAL 

|

Group

'One of the core tenets of pragmatism, despite its various formulations by William James, Jane Addams, John Dewey, and neo-pragmatists like Rorty, Habermas, and Putnam, is an epistemological axiom first formulated in 1868 by Charles Sanders Peirce. This maxim, often dubbed the pragmatic maxim, states that the meaning of our ideas is best expounded when we can spell out the implications or the effects of these ideas in real-world experience and practice (Peirce 1878).' pp.105-106. (Racine, 2024).

physical - SELF - My body[?]

'The lack of consideration of downside risks applies to all COVID-19 countermeasures, including mass-masking (e.g. the social and psychological consequences of mask-wearing for all kinds of social interaction, most notably in educational and childcare settings) and to the accelerated approval of vaccines. The latter is particularly noteworthy because the need for rigorous testing of new medications to guard against the risk of side effects is a standard axiom of contemporary ethical medical practice. Given that the vaccines in question employed novel mechanisms, not testing them sufficiently to assure their longer term safety was stratospherically risky: it meant that the possibility that this vaccination programme would do more harm than good could not be excluded. Yet, the medical establishment stood foursquare behind it, insisting on the safety and efficacy of the vaccines and pillorying any, including those within it, who demurred.' p.55. (Kelly, 2023).

'“Never have we been so free. Never have we felt so powerless”: this, according to Bauman, is the paradox of our time. Verhaeghe writes with a variant: “Never before have we in the West had it so good, and never have we felt so bad.”33 Because neoliberal axioms determine the standards of what is healthy and normal, society sees those who do not want to participate as sick or abnormal.' pp.97-98. (Vanheste, 2023).

My emphasis

Racine, E. (2024). What Participatory Research and Methods Bring To Ethics: Insights From Pragmatism, Social Science, and Psychology. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 34(1), 99-134. 
 https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ken.2024.a943431.

Kelly, M.G.E. (2023). Securing the Pandemic: Biopolitics, Capital, and COVID-19. Foucault Studies 35, 46-69. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/940834.

Vanheste, J. (2023). Half a Century of Exhaustion and Madness: The Fiftieth Anniversary of Pink Floyd's The Dark Side of the Moon. Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 106(1), 87-109. 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/950363.

See also: 'axiom' : 'algebra' : 'pragmatism'

Person-centred care = care axiomatics at a collective and individual level?

The first rule (axiom?) of first aid is...?

Paper: Geopolitical factors and mental health I [mapped to h2cm]

" ... we propose that mental health must be seen as a key strategic goal of foreign policy and be used as a measure of success of the foreign aid to ensure that individual people with mental illness are guaranteed a role and support in the civil society and their needs – clinical or social – do not get swept under the carpet. To this end, we examine some key statistics and to address the mental health needs of those worst placed, we propose an index – the Compassion, Action, Pragmatism and Evidence (CAPE) Vulnerability Index – that identifies the most vulnerable communities so that international aid may be more appropriately targeted, possibly ‘ring fenced’ making mental health a strategic building block of foreign policy." p.779.

individual

|

INTERPERSONAL : SCIENCES

humanistic ----------------------------------------------- mechanistic

SOCIOLOGY : POLITICAL

|

group

wither mental health in relief, shorter life compared with general population,  poverty including  As a child As an adult Vicious cycle 1: Disaster experiences - mental health Traumatic Stress Disorder**

Natural & man-made disasters, health crises, e.g. Ebola, Conflict, War Climate warming Humanitarian intervention: Emphasis on physical survival and physical health Statistics: globally Proposed index: the Compassion, Action, Pragmatism and Evidence (CAPE) Vulnerability Index – that identifies the most vulnerable communities

Vicious cycle 1: [**Intergenerational transmission of stress and trauma - Epigenetics, social memory]  Social upheaval, migration and displacement mental illnesses assoc with social failures such as poor parenting, school failure, domestic violence and toxic stress, impacted prospects on earning a living, stigma social exclusion Social Determinants of Health Displacement refugees, poverty, women, children,  trafficking, rape

Foreign Policy Relief: mental illness = denial of - human rights, vote, marriage, inheritance, make a will Vicious cycle 2: corruption - inequality sequestration of assets crime, law & order Disaster ('declaration') Mental health problems cost the world some US$2.5 trillion per year  (US$16.1 trillion by 2030) Foreign aid & assistance Foreign policy Populism

Persaud, A. et al. (2018) Geopolitical factors and mental health I. International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 64(8) 778–785. DOI: 10.1177/0020764018808548
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020764018808548?journalCode=ispa&

n.b. I have added epigenetics and the intergenerational transmission of stress and trauma.

Book review - "Human Landscapes: Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology"

'After Ethnos', a previous book review was an enjoyable challenge. As a nurse, you are, to a certain extent several disciplines all rolled into one, sociologist, psychologist, diplomat, anthropologist ... but After Ethnos and now Dreon's 'Human Landscapes' bring their own demands.

If it was experiment that attracted me to Tobias Rees's book, Dreon's title works on two levels.

Hodges' model anticipates different 'landscapes'. The model also provides a lesson in pragmatism (another post) with pragmatism identified as a method to research Hodges' model.

On health care education programmes, how often do we write of human nature, cognition, or cognitive processes, qualitative and quantitative, subjective and objective? How quickly do we present ourselves, and the readers of assignments with dichotomies, dualities, and polarities?

Just 40 pages in they are here in expected and welcome abundance. I clearly have some reading to do [ that's why it's a review! :-) ] and from reading, much to critique in my differentiation between phenomena and as concepts presented here on W2tQ.

"... the conceptual framework for my approach to human nature is represented by cultural naturalism— that is, a nonreductive form of naturalism that assumes culture to be continuous with nature, rooted in the very organic and environmental conditions of human life, and yet irreducible to the mere association of preexisting resources." p.23

Human landscapes

"Nonetheless, even if we wish to focus on a theoretical analysis of the concept, the idea of human nature seems to display a tangle of problems, punctuated by distinctions that could be useful when treated as functional and connected to specific contexts, but which are actually turned into dogmatic oppositions. One first form of dualism concerns the opposition between the innate and the acquired, between the allegedly innate equipment existing on the genetic or neural level and the properties and ways of behaving this is assumed to give rise to. To give but one example, based on Chomsky’s influential hypothesis, the idea of a neural program for producing grammar encoded in our genes has been assumed to be an efficient (and sometimes sufficient) cause for specific linguistic practices. From this point of view, nurture, culture, and institutions seem to be something completely different from nature, since they supervene on an already fixed material substratum as an adjunct." pp.17-18.

"Taking this or that snapshot of a human could be a useful intellectual expedient in specific circumstances, but “[b]iologically all growth is modification and all organs have to be treated and understood as developments out of something else and as pointing forward to still something else” (Dewey 1985b, 32–33)." pp.19-20.

"I believe that the conceptual opposition between subjective and objective qualities is like a net with too wide a mesh, unable to catch the complexity of our interactions with the world. The problem, I would argue, is that this opposition often involves the idea that qualitative experience is a private, purely first-person experience, consequently posing problems of public access." pp.33-34.

"The section 2 will focus on the Pragmatists’ conception of experience as something broader and richer than cognition—because, in turn, cognition is understood as a specific phase within experience, responding to the needs and problems emerging from qualitative experience and ultimately returning to it. In this approach, perception through the senses and pure sense data are reframed within the context of inquiry, as features that are pointed out, discriminated, and isolated from a more holistic field of experience according to an
idea, namely, the anticipation of the possible consequences of an action or a certain assumption." pp.37-38.

Not sure why, but at one point, reading prompted consideration of: 'lived experience' and the role of peer support workers?

Starting the book, Dreon is (naturally) laying out the scope and structure of the book. Not just a preface but first chapter, and it looks like - the second. As I get more accustomed to Dreon's style (I'm a nurse remember) there are valuable lessons in laying out arguments, with more reward to follow I trust. I have a sense of a wall, not an impenetrable one, but one that is well argued - the blocks shifting into place - even if I cannot grasp their true significance to specialists in this field.

More to follow.

Dreon R. (2022) Human landscapes. Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology. Suny Press, Albany.

Many thanks to Roberta and Suny Press for my copy (confession to follow).

Book review iii "Human Landscapes: Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology"

 

Human Landscapes

As per previous 'reviews', this reader can get lost in the Introduction.

Discussing - "interactions, and loop effects within the organic-environmental system" - there is emergentism, causality, teleology, and supervenience with argument about definitions and word-use through the historical development of pragmatism and understanding of human behaviour individually, collectively and as a culture.

 A close reading can help, is called for here ...

 

 
What is of interest to me at present is the non-surprising mention of logic, Dreon points to the many problems that Dewey and pragmatic and other philosophers encountered from the introduction of subjective-objective dichotomies. 

For a mental health nurse the intra- interpersonal is your 'bread and butter' so to speak. Dreon has you reflecting on your professional field, by raising the dichotomy of feelings and cognition, the psychical and the physical aspects of emotions, language and experience. (Interesting, does a pragmatic approach foster identification of dichotomy or continuity?)

For a moment on page 66 I thought we were still on the introduction: 

"The final chapter of this volume will be devoted to the development of a qualitatively richer conception of human linguistic experience conceived as continuous, rather than as opposed to sensibility."

But this is fine and is a statement of Dreon's argument, its depth in dealing with the thought of Dewey, James and others (e.g. Mead). This is dense, and yet detailed, when it is not your field, but you can - begin, at least - to see how the historical development of pragmatism (schools of philosophy), psychology and sociology create so many dilemmas and debates:

"In my opinion, some of the Classical Pragmatists’ insights should
be brought to a coherent conclusion by basically working on two sides,
in order to avoid a foundational conception of language, while at the
same time gaining a more rounded view on sensibility, as it unfolds in
our ordinary lives. As already hinted at in response to Dreyfus, I endorse
a more complex conception of language as primarily consisting in fully
embodied and socially shared linguistic practices that have a variety
of different ends in view and are largely regulated by an affectively or
qualitatively oriented mutual sensibility." p.66.

The book is also 'developmental' too:

"Those practices—from so-called motherese to lullabies, nursery rhymes, and storytelling—are often specifically directed at eliciting responses from the baby and catching attention. The baby’s behaviors—shaking the arms, keeping the eyes wide open,
squealing—are strongly embodied, even when they are vocal; but they are also affectively based and oriented responses to cultural-linguistic stimulations on the part of its caregivers." p.67.

All this shouted emergence to me (and as above), and Dreon rewards this reading. 

Thinking about the 'logic' (if any) in Hodges' model, this stood out:

"The point is to change our approach and to adopt the point of view of the
shared social context in which an individual’s first perceptions occur,
rather than the still monological perspective of an isolated individual
as the primary starting point of experience." p.67.

With more to follow ... I know now why I saved this:

embodied nature

an interactive installation to nurture
our sensibility to the living world

Dreon R. (2022) Human landscapes. Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology. Suny Press, Albany.

https://sunypress.edu/Books/H/Human-Landscapes

Video: Roux, Caroline, Design Miami: Tangled up in the natural world. FT Weekend, Collecting, 27-28 November 2021, p.3.

https://mischertraxler.com/projects/embodied-nature/

Thoughts ii re. 2026 Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress Workshop

For me, applying Hodges' model I tend to place philosophy and psychiatry (mind, thought, belief, truth, intention ...) within the humanistic part of the model. So, Ewa Grzeszczak and - Philosophy of psychiatry and the methodology of social ontology - stood out. This is helpful as Homeostatic Property Clusters (HPC) are a useful structure, spanning bio-mathematics. As suggested previously with 'equality', we can place the philosophical non-trivial question of kinds at the centre of Hodges' model and proceed (if possible?) from there.

The requirement for a holistic, integrative and pluralistic framework is there in literature. A statement supported by Alessandra Civani's talk: 'What kind of concept is ‘incongruence’? I located a paper:

Enactive psychiatry - A pragmatic and pluralistic approach to mental health and disease

- (and now have a copy c/o and thanks to Alessandra) and am grateful to being pointed to de Haan:

An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry

 I will (must) return to these papers. Earlier on Hodges' model, I'd opined (as on 'X') how the -

• medical
• biomedical
• bio-psycho-social models - are insufficient in the 21st century.

There was a thematic feel to the presentations with Anna Golova - Self-illness ambiguity without a self-illness distinction - following nicely. The styling on the slides was an added bonus. I located an informative (co-authored) paper by Golova:

‘Is it me or my illness?’: self-illness ambiguity as a useful conceptual lens for psychiatry'

Part of the power of Hodges' model derives not so much from its duality; as its dual axes. The two axes can encompass and handle the relatedness between/within reductionism, holist perspectives, the self and otherness, illness and health (well-being).

An hours break brought us to an event which was very well attended, clearly open to the public:

6-7pm Prof Miriam Solomon – Royal Institute of Philosophy talk ‘Stigma as an actant in the history of psychiatry’

In setting out the talk's structure I liked Prof. Solomon's reference to the common, implicit "grime" theory of the dynamic of stigma, and "punching down" as a strategy for managing stigma. 'Grime' made me think of sense of smell, the grime in my father's work van, a diesel. Now so many memories are evoked with the merest whiff. More positively, the patina of physical and mental life also came to mind. You would - might think stigma has been dealt with by now, but of course we are socio-politically far from it.

There is a related podcast from 2025, which also covers Prof. Solomon's early studies. A previous paper was also noted in the slides:

Solomon, M. (2025). The Elusiveness of Hermeneutic Injustice in Psychiatric Categorizations. Social Epistemology, 39(2), 166–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2024.2400068

 

Discussion of the DSM inevitably followed (and in the above podcast). In questions the 'reality' of severe mental illness, and suggestion of the acute challenge of managing the negative symptoms of psychoses.

 

Prof. Solomon's conclusion was well worth waiting for, including:

Stigma as an "actant" (cf. Bruno Latour's concept of an agent: causal role without intention)... DSM - ICD...

 

If stigma disappeared tomorrow, the DSM would not have the same categories. 

 

Stigma (more specifically, its management) is shaping the conceptual space, with both scientific and moral consequences.

[Added 4th March...] On Friday - Sam Fellowes, took on, or has taken on - the non-trivial issue of - Modelling psychiatric diagnoses when self-diagnosing - how does this work? Complexity was acknowledged on the first slide, with self-diagnosis, and modelling, set against the Duhem-Quine thesis. 

This technical aspect is welcome and no doubt essential given the socio-technical nature of diagnosis, touching as it does the public (society), primary care, psychiatry, service user groups, policymakers, informatics, and HM Treasury, amongst several 'stakeholders'. With the impact of the internet and social media, much (if not all?) of the vocabulary of mental health professionals has been co-opted and re-framed(?) by patient / service-user groups? It does not, for example, appear that the agency behind the DSM will be able to claim it back. Autism and ADHD were also discussed and debated. I located a previous chapter by Sam (pay-wall):

Fellowes S. Self-Diagnosis in Psychiatry and the Distribution of Social Resources. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 2023;94:55-76. doi:10.1017/S1358246123000218

 

This really is a thicket of thorns, it spreads as and wherever you go.

 

The welfare bill is such that there should have been government Ministers in attendance. I have responded on behalf of clients to PIP assessments. Agencies have invited me to interview for 'Disability Assessor' roles. Not only is this a complex web, but several logics obtain: a perverse temporal logic operates, binary logic and a fixed mindset can develop so that some (vulnerable!?) individuals can get stuck. Perhaps, a social imperative steps in and disrupts, life chances: their being a NEET ('a young person who is no longer in the education system and who is not working or being trained for work'. Ecosia) is better for someone else? 

 

To unpick, make sense of this, you need a foundational universal model.

 

There is a (co-authored) paper from Giulia Russo, who presented - Epistemic and political role of experience: https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTPO-112 from which:

'As it is widely known, epistemic injustice was introduced by Fricker (2007) to unveil power relations that have negative consequences on people as epistemic agents. She distinguished in particular two different kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. The first kind occurs when a person (usually in a disadvantaged and oppressed role within the epistemic relation) is damaged as a knower because, as the name suggests, their testimony is overlooked, dismissed or invalidated. The second kind of epistemic injustice occurs when a person is deprived of the epistemic resources to even explain or articulate their experience of distress, or of systemic oppression. In connection to this, the concepts of neurodivergence and neurodiversity come from the political and social arena, and are born explicitly to contrast dominant pathologizing narratives in psychiatry.'

In seeking some 'test' cases to try to model relationally, Hodges' model suggests at least four - without letting the care / knowledge domains wag-the-dog. Giulia's talk was very helpful, ranging across forms of epistemic injustice (addressed by others too), identity, neurodivergence, lived experience, self-, counter- and collective narratives with references. A great resource.

 

Frank Denning, reminded me of an important phenomena, in Using Stebbing’s Directional Analysis to Evaluate ‘Mentalizing’. Talking therapies, or more properly referral to talking therapies often presents several criteria that would-be subjects must 'pass'. An ability to mentalize, can represent one. This is understanable, for effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy ... it is to be found in the manual. But, in terms of power relations, gate keeping in various forms is a literal (virtual) key to service access. Hodges' model is no different (sigh!). At what age can people start to use Hodges' model? What mentalization is involved to cognitively engage in use of Hodges' model? 

 

I struggled to obtain a copy of Stebbing's original work from 1930, but see how closely tied the work is to physics. An Internet Archive copy is poor quality. The search will continue, as I suspect there are links to Bill Ross's text on Deleuzian cosmology. It is marvellous that work from 1930 resonates today. There is: 

Janssen-Lauret, F. (Accepted/In press). Directional Analysis in Susan Stebbing’s Philosophy of Physics. In S. Chapman (Ed.), Susan Stebbing on Logic and Analysis Springer Nature. 

https://pure.manchester.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/338653274/Directional_Analysis_in_Susan_Stebbing_s_Philosophy_of_Physics_Final_.pdf

Gloria Ayob - Flourishing as mental health - was encouraging. 'TASK 1:EQUATION' a slide was titled, including emotional disorder is meta-evaluative; there are negative and positive poles, plus isomorphism between unpleasantness-pleasantness and disorder-health. I think my stomach was protesting I should have paid more attention. There is a blog post by Gloria: https://blog.oup.com/2024/12/the-concept-of-emotional-disorder/

After lunch Richard Hassall - Hermeneutical Injustice and Damaged Intellectual Self-Trust in Psychiatric Service Users, a reminder of the time and effort that needs to be put into public and patient involvement and engagement in mental health service (when this is desired). References included J.L. Austin and J.S. Bruner. A paper:

Hassall R. Sense-making and hermeneutical injustice following a psychiatric diagnosis. J Eval Clin Pract. 2024 Aug;30(5):848-854. doi: 10.1111/jep.13971. Epub 2024 Feb 20. PMID: 38375925.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jep.13971 

Scoping reviews are more common it seems: Lara Calabrese - Exploring epistemic injustice in dementia care: a scoping review and a qualitative study, plus paper [with QR code on the slide]:

Calabrese L, Brigiano M, Quartarone M, Chirico I, Trolese S, Lambiase F, Forte L, Annini A, Bortolotti L, Chattat R. I'm still here and my opinion matters: a scoping review on the experience of epistemic injustice among people living with dementia. Curr Psychol. 2025 Dec 17;45(1):s12144-025-08519-y. doi: 10.1007/s12144-025-08519-y. PMID: 41445984; PMCID: PMC7618523.

 

The paper's title here brought to mind the radio programme "Does He Take Sugar?" Questions followed regards the studies methods. Since leaving I wondered if there has been an evaluation of Dementia Friendly Communities? Are there dots to usefully joined there?

 

The final talk was delivered (with gusto - pepped me up anyway) by Jacob Barlow - Epistemic borders: experts, communities, communication. Jacob's interest in pragmatism was apparent. I look forward to reading future work, and note Liverpool 2025: ‘Problems with Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Psychiatry’.

All in all, a stimulating and enjoyable event.

Threshold Concepts: Pre-conference Health and Social Care

Yesterday afternoon there was a video-linked workshop between Glasgow, Halifax, Nova Scotia - Dalhousie University and an interest group member in Plymouth. This was to try to further thinking on threshold concepts in healthcare and one of two pre-conference workshops at:

6TH BIENNIAL THRESHOLD CONCEPTS CONFERENCE

Our agenda:

Workshop: To disaggregate or not? The dilemma of complex threshold concepts

• What do we mean by complex thresholds?
• Is this particularly relevant to healthcare and if so how?
• Can we identify some examples in health and social care?
• What problems do complex thresholds bring for teachers, learners, the curriculum?
• Is disaggregation helpful (and how) or unhelpful/reductionist/simplification?
• Do we have any evidence or theories that can help us?

We did not cover all the points in depth, but in respect of the first point I could define 'complex thresholds' with recourse to Hodges' model. The paper I'm working on includes a table that alludes to this. I could take this question more literally in that draft.

Thinking about complexity and aggregation, by complex is this the same as compound? Compound suggests something that can be taken apart (it is composite), but complex involves the whole (domain-based?) situation / context?

The example I have in mind is learner's recognition, appreciation and understanding of:

• mental capacity
• best interest
• deprivation of liberty

By learner's I am thinking of student nurses (plus other disciplines), healthcare assistants and future associate practitioners. In the era of lifelong learners, public engagement and patient involvement/engagement I have include others (despite the academic demands for specificity).

Philosophy Now 113

On the last question - Do we have any evidence or theories that can help us? - I still feel evidence can be found in Hodges' model. As ever: data, data, data!

Feelings are never enough (until they are all we are left with).

Discussion included the curriculum as the questions indicate, and again one of the original purposes for the model was in curriculum development. but in addition the position and role of the 'big picture'.

Issue 113 of Philosophy Now featured New Realism. I'm cherry picking from pragmatism, idealism and realism. New realism questions whether a unified picture (in philosophy) is available (p.7). While this is a damaging critique to Hodges' model, it might also be an opportunity.

Steinbauer, A. (2016). Interview: Markus Gabriel, Philosophy Now, Apr/May, 113; pp.6-10.

Book review ii "Human Landscapes: Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology"

When I have a book to review I need a hard copy - too much screen already - and while I hope the review is worth the author's and publisher's kind engagement my purpose includes gathering insights and evidence to support the project here.

Back in July I lost this book (OK I fessed up). I've searched ... and must have left it somewhere! This is a great loss.*

Human Landscapes

Thankfully, Roberta forwarded an early pdf, and I'm enjoying an informed and challenging read:

The author's task:

"... only a few scholars have sought to outline a philosophical anthropology through a pragmatist lens." p.8.

Distracted, as ever, I'm making progress and can see an author who is:

- embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended (p.7) - in this subject matter.

I'm going backwards from post i, but I commented on this:

"Even if Michael Quante’s proposal is not grounded in Pragmatism, I agree with his claim that, in order to be pragmatistic, a philosophical anthropology should assume that each concept or theory requires questions like: “How is this related to human action? What place does it have in the context of our
actions? (2018, 22)." p.15.

In the context here, this is precisely the role of Hodges' model, at the conceptual level - placement in the care domains, and in theory, care approach (context), philosophy. I like Dreon's focus on evaluation too, and the fact that an example is the impact of COVID on education and the resort and reliance of online learning.

Dreon concentrates on the organism and the environment (a key debate) from across the literature, and discusses concepts that are notoriously problematic, terms like, sensibility, and human nature.

"The situation is particularly complex because, evidently, this is not a merely
theoretical issue; rather, it has serious existential implications, both moral
and political." p.17.

Reading, I instantly thought of the social determinants of health [SDoH], moving away from reductive explanations. But the SDoH are precarious in the extent to which they will affect policy, and give rise to specific metrics - similarly to the sustainable development goals [SDGs]. These have a pragmatic and clearly anthropocentric quality about them. As Dreon notes the oppositions and dichotomies (very quickly as per post i) these policies 'light up' the humanistic domains. As health professionals and educators we can shout, warm, warmer, colder ... to the policy makers (and currently the 'purse' holders).

A 'good' book reassures you about what you've read - Whorf, time, Hopi; but also points to what you might like to read:

"In his entry for the Encyclopaedia, Dewey claims that isolating
the allegedly native and original constitution of human nature is possible
only through the assumption of a static point of view on it, for example,
by privileging features at birth over traits characterizing the intrauterine
past or the organism’s future development and adulthood." p.19.

Bubbles: Spheres I by Peter Sloterdijk, Wieland Hoban (Translator) - my emphasis above.

My .pdf copy is littered with comments where I (inevitably) read evidence in support of h2cm. I don't want to dilute Dreon's purpose, which is comprehensive (for me) in referencing and critical analysis of the latest thought. But if Roberta and Suny Press will (please) forgive me for losing the hard-copy hopefully they can see why I draw attention to the following:

"Grene was very careful to avoid reducing the relationship between biological factors and culture to causal dependence: she preferred to speak of a widespread dependence of sociocultural life on biophysical reality and to consider the relation as an “anthropological circle” (Peterson 2010)." p.24.

 INDIVIDUAL

|

 INTERPERSONAL    :     SCIENCES               

HUMANISTIC --------------------------------------  MECHANISTIC      

SOCIOLOGY  :   POLITICAL 

|

GROUP

sustainable mindset (volunteered - incentivised)	"biophysical reality"
"sociocultural life"	circular economy

There are many circles, not just at work, but circles that need to work.

More to follow - as I pick up speed ...

Dreon R. (2022) Human landscapes. Contributions to a pragmatist anthropology. Suny Press, Albany.

https://sunypress.edu/Books/H/Human-Landscapes

*Looking at the photo, the table looks like a Booths cafe? I have phoned them and elsewhere - no joy. :-(

International Conference: the Concept of Attention - IEF

Filosofia na Agenda

international conference
the concept of attention

Theme and Objectives

Attention constitutes one of the most fundamental yet under-theorized dimensions of human experience. Despite its centrality to perception, cognition, action, and intersubjectivity, the philosophical investigation of attention as a concept in its own right remains surprisingly underdeveloped. This international conference represents the first major initiative of a four-year research program (2025-2029) dedicated to establishing the philosophy of attention as a major field of contemporary philosophical inquiry.

The philosophical engagement with attention has deep historical roots. Already in ancient Greek thought, we find attention implicitly at stake in the Socratic contrast between an 'examined' and an 'unexamined' life and in the dialectical reform of ordinary reason pursued throughout Plato's dialogues. Medieval philosophy anticipates later developments through its emphasis on representation and intentionality (intentio), particularly in the works of Augustin, Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Yet it is only with Descartes's Meditations that attention receives explicit philosophical treatment, emerging as the crucial mediating link between radical doubt and epistemic certainty. This Cartesian innovation opens a rich trajectory of reflection, pursued by thinkers as diverse as Malebranche, Berkeley, Locke, and Wolff.

The scope of philosophical inquiry into attention expands dramatically from the late 18th century onwards. No longer confined to epistemological questions, attention becomes central to investigating the fundamental structures of subjectivity itself. French spiritualism, phenomenology, and philosophies of existence explore how attention relates to apperception, sensation, emotion, and volition—a trajectory that runs from Maine de Biran and Bergson through the phenomenological movement, encompassing figures from Paul Ricoeur to Michel Henry. Meanwhile, William James's psychological and philosophical investigations, along with later thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Simone Weil, and Iris Murdoch, demonstrate attention's significance across multiple philosophical domains.

Indeed, contemporary philosophy recognizes attention as fundamental to a remarkable range of inquiries. In ethics, attention emerges as an essential vehicle for exercising personal and collective virtues. Aesthetics invokes attention in debates about the nature of beauty and our engagement with works of art—their creation, appreciation, and critique. Social and political philosophy identifies attention as a central component of the modern media landscape, where it functions as a valuable and increasingly contested economic resource. Environmental philosophy calls upon attention to help conceptualize our evolving and often precarious relationship with the natural world. Across these diverse contexts, attention appears as a fundamental human capacity whose nature and quality largely determine the kinds of bonds we can establish with each other and our surrounding world.

This conference seeks to bring these rich historical engagements into systematic dialogue with contemporary philosophy. We welcome contributions from all philosophical traditions and approaches, including but not limited to: the reflexive tradition, hermeneutics, phenomenology, empiricist and analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, pragmatism, and non-Western philosophical traditions. We aim to explore how different philosophical frameworks have conceptualized attention's structure, dynamics, and normative dimensions, and how these varied perspectives can illuminate both historical debates and current research.

Full details: international conference: the concept of attention

Image: https://www.wikiart.org/en/theo-van-doesburg/heroic-movement-1916

Review: iv Kinchin's Visualising Powerful Knowledge to Develop the Expert Student

It seems there is no escape from 'learning styles'. Just when you thought they are dated and defunct like a Whac-A-Mole up they pop.

Here on serialists and holist - 'big picture' learners (p.37). Kinchin writes:

"Like the deep-surface binary, the holist-serialist dichotomy covers a diversity of perspectives, details of which can be analysed using concept mapping. Concept maps provide an indicator of a student's learning approach for a given context. Raynor and Riding (1997:21) have speculated that:

"The idea that 'style awareness' may help reach reach the 'hard to reach', and perhaps contribute to reducing failure generally by enhancing the learning process, is an elusive but tantalising prospect which clearly merits further attention.' (p.37)

Kinchin cites research on the influence of existing knowledge on learning. How students may simultaneously hold misconceptions and more acceptable (professional) conceptions. Perhaps a way to resolve the learning styles 'debate' is to have tools that can potentially cater for all learning styles? The chapter heading 'Patterns of Learning' points to other requirements, especially in respect of personal learning journeys. As Kinchin discusses conceptual ecologies. This is a very appropriate description for what Hodges' model provides (p.38); and a gestalt (p.43). The domains encourage 'travel' and exploration, as the student formulates a "cycle of concepts" (within one, or around several domains) a means to help integrate a context or situation. The domains of Hodges' model act as placeholders for several concepts simultaneously, whether contentious or not (p.38) or as a source of  'troublesome knowledge'." (p.37).

I've been drawn to Dewey and pragmatism in educational thought, given the accent on a natural and active approach to learning. Chapter 4 moves to Presenting the Curriculum (subtitle: hiding the discipline from view). This surely speaks to the interdisciplinary, interprofessional nature of education in the 21st Century and even the increasing instances(?) when transdisciplinary approaches are needed? Hodges' model predates Project 2000 and the shift of UK nurse education to degree pathways. Mid 1980s the model was created to facilitate curriculum design and Kinchin sees concept maps as evidencing curriculum design and a means to communicate design, communication and implementation.

Four reasons for use of concept maps in relation to curriculum design - summarised here:

1. Concepts maps support 'big picture thinking'. ...
2. Concept maps are embedded in contructivist learning theory ...
3. Concept maps support collaborative planning ...
4. Concept maps reduce the 'cognitive load' placed on teachers* ... (p.54).

I like to the emphasis in this book on structure. The concept maps - learning patterns and curricula, knowledge and very well referenced. 'Cumulative learning' could refer to cramming, committing facts to memory for regurgitation, but it doesn't. It is about student's "understandings integrate and subsume with previous knowledge, or 'segmented learning' where new ideas or skills are accumulated alongside rather than build on past knowledge." (p.55).

Not quite the center of the book, but page 56 introduces a key concept (in Chapter 7) in semantic gravity.

*This came up a lot generally - students too - within educational technology in MRES studies at University of Lancaster.

to be continued...

Roland Tormey (2014) The centre cannot hold: untangling two different trajectories of the ‘approaches to learning’ framework, Teaching in Higher Education, 19:1, 1-12.
DOI: 10.1080/13562517.2013.827648

Novak, J.D. and Symington, D.J. (1982) Concept mapping for curriculum development. Victoria Institute for Educational Research Bulletin, 48: 3–11.

Kinchin, I., (2016) Visualising powerful knowledge to develop the expert student. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

See also:

Intro post

Review One

Two

Three

Five

Six

Thanks to Brill for my review copy.